WAYNE WITHERS ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Landowners sought review of an Agricultural Zoning Board decision denying their request to reclassify property as agricultural for tax purposes. The court held that Florida law requires actual physical use and activity on the land for bona fide agricultural purposes, not merely a lease to a farmer, to qualify for preferential agricultural tax treatment.
Land does not qualify for preferential agricultural tax treatment under Section 193.461 F.S. based solely on a lease to a farmer without evidence of actual physical use and activity for bona fide agricultural purposes. At minimum, there must be some preparatory work such as clearing, planting, or cultivation conducted on the land itself.
[1] A taxpayer seeking preferential agricultural zoning for ad valorem tax purposes bears the burden of proving entitlement to the exemption.
[2] The "actual use" requirement for agricultural zoning necessitates physical activity on the land, including at a minimum, preparatory work such as clearing, planting, or c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 193.461(3) F.S. (1971), F.S. A., requires 'actual use' of the property for a 'bona fide agricultural purpose'. The favorable tax treatment accorded by this statute is predicated on land use, i. e., physical activity conducted on the land.”
Establishes the legal requirement for agricultural tax classification: actual physical use and activity, not merely status or intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants, who are landowners, applied for agricultural zoning classification on their property for ad valorem tax purposes. At the hearing before th…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, who are landowners, by certiorari in the circuit court sought review of a decision by the Agricultural Zoning Board of Dade County denying the landowners’ request to reclassify their property as agricultural for ad valo-rem tax purposes. The circuit judge denied certiorari and this appeal is from that decision.
The circuit judge has set out the facts as follows:
“Plaintiffs timely applied for agricultural zoning on their property. A hearing on plaintiffs’ application was held before the Agricultural Zoning Board, at which the application was denied. Plaintiffs timely filed the instant petition for certiorari to review the Board’s decision. A certified transcript of the Board’s proceedings and briefs were filed. On January 5, 1973, the Court heard final argument.
“Section 193.461 F.S. (1971), F.S.A., grants preferential treatment to land zoned agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes. A taxpayer seeking the special exception exemption accorded land zoned agricultural has the burden of showing his entitlement thereto. Jar Corp. v. Culbertson, 2 So. 2d 144 (3rd D.C.A., Fla.1971). The Agricultural Zoning Board is an administrative board. One who asserts the affirmative of an issue before an administrative board has the burden of proof. State Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Strickland, 262 So. 2d 893 (1st D.C.A., Fla., 1972). Accordingly, plaintiffs had a twofold burden of demonstrating to the Agricultural Zoning Board that their land was entitled to be classified as agricultural under Section 193.461.
“Whether a particular tract of land is to be classified as agricultural for tax as sessment purposes is a question of fact. Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971). Plaintiffs are seeking review by certiorari of the Board’s decision on this factual issue. This Court’s review is confined solely to the record of proceedings conducted by the Board, to determine whether the Board had substantial competent evidence before it to support its decision while conforming to the essential requirements of law. DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla.1957).
“At the hearing before the-Board' on the subject property, the sole evidence presented by plaintiffs was an affidavit of their lessee. The affidavit stated that the lessee is a farmer and that the property was leased for the purpose of raising field crops thereon. It further stated that as of January 1, 1972, no -crops' were growing on the land and that it had not yet been cultivated or planted. There was no evidence presented that the property had a prior history of agricultural use or that it was physically used for agricultural purposes as of the first of the year. The assessor stated no agriculture was found on the property and presented an aerial photograph thereof.”
The circuit judge found as follows:
“Section 193.461(3) F.S. (1971), F.S. A., requires ‘actual use’ of the property for a ‘bona fide agricultural purpose’. The favorable tax treatment accorded by this statute is predicated on land use, i. e., physical activity conducted on the land. Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So. 2d 407 (4th D.C.A., Fla. 1972). At the very minimum, there must be some preparatory work (clearing or planting or cultivation) done on the land. See Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971) ; Mackle v. Metropolitan Dade County, 220 So. 2d 422 (3rd D.C.A., Fla.1969).”
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We concur and adopt the circuit judge’s opinion relying especially upon authority of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Greenwood v. Oates, Fla.1971, 251 So. 2d 665, where the Supreme Court quashed a decision of the District Court of Appeal holding that the land should be assessed as agricultural. In its opinion, the Supreme Court relied on several grounds, one of which was the trial court’s finding that the taxpayer had conducted no physical activity on the land or agricultural purpose since he had developed it.
Affirmed.
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- de Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957)
- Carroll v. State, 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971)
- Ford Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Strickland, 262 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- ST. JOE Paper Co. v. Mickler, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)
- Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)
- The MacKle Co., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 220 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)