CHARLES E. NICKS, APPELLANT,
v.
HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP, APPELLEE
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Charles E. Nicks appeals a summary judgment denying him coverage under his father's corporation's uninsured motorist insurance policy after being injured in a motorcycle accident. The court holds that the policy's plain language covering only the named insured—the corporation—is unambiguous and does not extend to the appellant, rejecting his contention that household and family relationship provisions create coverage.
The court holds that the policy language is unambiguous and does not provide coverage to the appellant. The term 'named insured' has a restricted meaning that applies only to those actually named in the policy, and the corporation's designation as the sole named insured does not extend coverage to the appellant despite his household relationship and employment with the corporation.
[1] The term "named insured" in an insurance policy has a restricted meaning and applies only to those specifically named in the policy.
[2] An insurance policy issued to a corporation, which does not designate any other insured, will not be construed to cover individuals who are not explicitly named as insure…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In interpreting insurance policies, the courts have uniformly held that the term 'named insured' has a restricted meaning and does not apply to any person other than those named in the policy.”
Establishes the foundational legal principle governing interpretation of 'named insured' in insurance policies
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant's father owned Tru-Flo Corporation, which carried an uninsured motorist insurance policy issued by Hartford. Appellant worked part-time for …
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MAXWELL, OLIVER C., Circuit Judge (Retired).
Charles E. Nicks appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Hartford. Charles E. Nicks’ father owned Tru-Flo Corporation, which corporation was insured by Hartford. Appellant was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle which collided with an automobile. Neither the motorcycle nor the automobile was insured and neither was owned by Tru-Flo Corporation or appellant’s father. Appellant claims coverage under this corporate insurance policy.
The policy, issued to the corporation (which did not designate any other insured in the space provided therefore) provided in the uninsured motorist coverage:
“II. PERSONS INSURED.
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the' extent set forth below:
(a) the named insured and any designated insured and, while residents of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either . . .
Tru-Flo Corporation was an active corporation owned by appellant’s father. Appellant worked for this corporation part-time and lived with his father. He contends that these provisions involving a family or household, together with the designation of the named beneficiary, are ambiguous and should be construed to grant him coverage. Insured was not on company business at the time of the accident. In a suit for declaratory decree the trial court held otherwise.
In Kohly v. Royal Indemnity Co., Fla.App.3d 1966, 190 So. 2d 819, it is said:
“In interpreting insurance policies, the courts have uniformly held that the term ‘named insured’ has a restricted meaning and does not apply to any person other than those named in the policy.”
The cases cited by appellant do not involve the definition of the insured but involve exclusions written into policies where there is no question as to who was intended to be insured, but whether an exclusion was valid. Boston Ins. Co. v. Smith, Fla.App. 1st 1963, 149 So. 2d 68 interpreted a provision relating to a newly acquired automobile; Davis v. United States Fidel. & G. Co., Fla.App.lst 1965, 172 So. 2d 485, construes language which attempts to limit amount of recovery in an uninsured motorist’s policy. Dyer v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 6, deals with conflicting provisions concerning damages to owner of multiple automobiles.
In First National Ins. Co. of America v. Devine, Fla.App.2d 1968, 211 So. 2d 587, this court held the provision in uninsured motorist policy excluding drivers under 25 was void as against public policy. Hodges v. National Union Indemnity Co., Fla.1971, 249 So. 2d 679, deals with the type of coverage afforded an automobile.
The remaining cases cited by the appellant have no relationship to the question before this court, i. e. whether there is ambiguity in naming only an active corporation as beneficiary under the policy. We are of the opinion that there is not and the trial court’s ruling is hereby
Affirmed.
MANN, C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
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Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pacura, 402 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…hiring the automobile, but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under (b) (1) or (2) above.” (emphases added) . We note that the Second District Court of Appeal, in Nicks v. Hartford Insurance Group, 291 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) did, in fact, determine a coverage question brought by a stranger to an insurance contract, who was claiming coverage based upon a claimed ambiguity. It did not, however, address the question of the right of the plaintiff to bring…
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Sipka v. Md. Cas. Co., 428 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bartoszewicz, 404 So. 2d 1053 (Fla.1981) and Nicks v. Hartford Insurance Group, 291 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.…
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Am. Fire & Cas. Co. & W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bradford Sinz, 487 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…signated insured and, while residents of the same household the spouse and relatives of either.” Appellants argue, in reliance upon Pearcy v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 429 So. 2d [*341] 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and Nicks v. Hartford Insurance Group, 291 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), that policies in which a corporation is the named insured can not provide any coverage to a relative because a corporation can have no relatives. There is, however, a substantial and important difference between the policy in the…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Turner Hodges v. Nat'l Union Indem. Co., 249 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1971)
- Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Boston Ins. Co. v. Smith, 149 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Davis v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. of Baltimore, 172 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- First Nat'l Ins. Co. OF Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Green v. State, 172 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1973)