CONSTANTINE LANTZ, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY OF SOUTH MIAMI, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, EX REL. RANDY EDES, APPELLEE
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A municipal court judge challenges a circuit court's decision to quash his conviction and sentencing orders in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a defendant challenging an excessive bail amount. The appellate court reversed, holding that the habeas corpus petition should have been dismissed once the actual custodian (the jail) was released from the action.
The circuit court misconceived the purpose of habeas corpus and erred in maintaining the writ against the judge after the actual custodian was dismissed. The habeas corpus petition should have been dismissed at that time. A judge who enters an order resulting in custody should not be named as respondent; the proper respondent is the party actually holding physical custody.
[1] A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of evidence or the effectiveness of counsel.
[2] A judge who issued an order resulting in a petitioner's custody should not be named as a respondent in a habeas corpus action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon this record, it affirmatively appears that the circuit judge misconceived the office of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”
Establishes the fundamental error: using habeas corpus as a vehicle for collateral review of convictions rather than as a remedy for unlawful custody.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRandy Edes was convicted in South Miami Municipal Court on three charges: resisting arrest, obstructing an officer, and assault and battery on a polic…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant is a City Judge of the Municipal Court for the City of South Miami, Florida. It appears from the record that he was improperly made a respondent to a petition for habeas corpus filed by Randy Edes in the circuit court. Edes was found guilty in the Municipal Court for South Miami on three separate charges: (1) resisting arrest, (2) obstructing an officer in the lawful execution of his duty, and (3) assault and battery on a police officer. Bail pending appeal was set at a total of $2,266. Private counsel for Edes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court alleging that the supersedeas bond set by the municipal judge was far in excess of petitioner’s financial ability as well as the standards set by the Florida Supreme Court, and thus amounted to an unconstitutional denial of bond. In addition, the petition alleged facts which would have been properly the subject of an appeal although the appeal time had not run, i. e., that petitioner’s representation by an assistant public defender was wholly ineffective. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the circuit judge directed to the Dade County Department of Corrections which at that time was holding the petitioner; the writ was also directed to the municipal judge. The case was set.--and. continued on several occasions, and on more than one occasion the city attorney who represented the municipal judge failed to appear when noticed.
Prior to the date set for the initial hearing, the circuit judge recognized^ the municipal judge’s error in setting ' the amount of the bond and entered an order releasing the petitioner from the Dade County Jail upon the posting of a $200 bond. This bond was posted and the petitioner was released. Thereafter, the’ Department of Corrections was dismissed as a respondent. The trial judge did not, however, discharge the writ but continued it in force against the municipal judge who is the appellant here.1 Eventually, oñ-the seventh time that the matter was set before the circuit judge and upon the failure of the city attorney to appear, the trial judge entered a judgment quashing the decision of the municipal court of South Miami.,-vacating the sentences and adjudications imposed, and discharging the petitioner from his convictions in the municipal court.
Upon this record, it affirmatively-appears that the circuit judge misconceived the office of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See McGuire v. Cochran, Fla. 1961, 135 So. 2d 226; Buchanan v. State ex rel. Hunt, Fla.App.1965, 171 So. 2d 186. The petition for habeas corpus should have been dismissed at the time that the respondent, Dade County Department of Corrections, was dismissed.
Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.
Reversed and remanded.
. The person to be named as the respondent in a habeas corpus action is the party holding custody and who is in a position to produce petitioner physically. The judge .who entered the order as a result of which the petitioner was placed in custody should not be made respondent. Clark v. State, Fla.App. 1960, 122 So. 2d 807, 809.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Alachua Reg'l Juv. Detention Ctr. v. T.O., 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996)…al boundaries. Moreover, the proper respondent in a habeas corpus petition is the party that has actual custody and is in a position to physically produce the petitioner. Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 355, 91 So. 376 (1921); Lantz v. State ex rel. Edes, 293 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Clark v. State ex rel. Rubin, 122 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); see also § 79.01, Fla. Stat. (1995) (“[T]he court, justice, or judge to whom such application is made shall grant the writ forthwith, against the person in whose cu…
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Hancock v. State, 386 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…immerman, Sheriff of Brevard County, Florida. As a general rule, the person holding custody and in a position to produce the petitioner, physically, is the proper person to be named respondent in a habeas corpus action. Lantz v. State ex rel. Edes, 293 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Clark v. State, 122 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). In Woods v. Cochran, 131 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1961), the petition improperly designated a circuit judge as respondent. The petition was treated as though the proper respondent, the dire…
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T.O. v. Alachua Reg'l Juv. Detention Ctr., 668 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…d the respondent is the party holding custody and who is in a position to produce the petitioner physically. 28 Fla.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 96 (1981). The judge who entered the detention order is not a proper respondent. Lantz v. State ex rel. Edes, 293 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). As a general rule, a court has no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person outside its territorial jurisdiction. 28 Fla.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 84. Because petitioner was being detained by a person within…
Authorities Cited
- Clark v. State of Fla. ex rel. Kate Rubin, 122 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Buchanan v. State of Fla. ex rel. John S. Hunt, 171 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- McGUIRE v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1961)