RAYMOND CASCI, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, RESPONDENT
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Florida's statute authorizing license revocation based on prior offenses does not violate the ex post facto clause, and forfeiture of bond may be treated as a conviction for purposes of license revocation.
A statute authorizing license revocation based on prior offenses does not constitute an ex post facto law, and forfeiture of bond may be treated as a conviction for purposes of regulating the driving privilege.
[1] A statute authorizing license revocation based on prior offenses does not violate the ex post facto clause when the triggering offense occurs after the statute's effectiv…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“What the Legislature has done is to declare that, given the past history of Casci, an offense committed after the effective date of the statute has the effect of authorizing the revocation of Casci's license.”
Explaining why the statute does not violate the ex post facto clause
Casci was charged with speeding on December 12, 1972, and forfeited his bond. He had a prior history of traffic offenses.…
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MANN, Chief Judge.
Casci’s claim that Fla.Stat. § 322.27 (5) F.S.A. (1972) is invalid as an ex post facto criminalization of conduct which occurred before its passage has been rejected by our sister courts. Zarsky v. State, Fla.App. 3d 1973, 281 So. 2d 553; Cappadona v. Keith, Fla.App. 4th 1974, 290 So. 2d 545, Opinion filed February 15, 1974. See also, Lord v. Davis, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 288 So. 2d 260. We agree. What the Legislature has done is to declare that, given the past history of Casci, an offense committed after the effective date of the statute has the effect of authorizing the revocation of Casci’s license. In short, Casci was under no compulsion to drive ninety miles per hour, as he did on December 12, 1972. When he did, and forfeited the bond he posted, he brought into play the effect of prior offenses prescribed by statute. We see no constitutional problem.
Casci’s second claim that treatment of estreature of bond as if there were a formal conviction is impermissible is without merit. Our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Kirkman, Fla.1962, 138 So. 2d 513, expressly upheld the power of the Legislature to specify that for the purposes of regulating the privilege of driving, Fla.Stat. § 322.-25(4) validly treats forfeiture as a conviction.
The petition being without merit, oral argument is dispensed with pursuant to Rule 3.10(e), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., and certiorari is denied.
BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962)
- Cappadona v. Keith, 290 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Zarsky v. State, 281 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Erznoznik v. City OF Jacksonville, 288 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)