HERMAN CHAMBERS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Herman Chambers, Jr. appealed his conviction for robbery following a jury trial that resulted in a forty-year sentence. The appellate court rejected his argument that the sentencing violated his constitutional right to jury trial by penalizing his rejection of a plea offer, but found merit in his claim regarding inadequate credit for time served.
The court held that no constitutional violation occurred under North Carolina v. Pearce because Chambers received identical sentences (forty years) on both convictions by the same judge, and the trial court's statement about the plea offer was proper procedure. However, the court found error in the failure to credit Chambers for all time served from his initial confinement in early 1972, and directed amendment of the confinement orders to reflect credit for all time actually served.
[1] A trial court's statement on the record regarding a plea offer, made in an abundance of caution and prior to trial, is proper when the defendant did not accept the offer.
[2] A defendant is not penalized for exercising the right to a jury trial when the sentence imposed after retrial is the same as the sentence imposed after the initial trial…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statement by the trial judge, objected to by appellant, clearly indicates that the court, of its own volition and in an abundance of caution and prior to the commencement of the trial, was putting on the record the fact that it was advised of the state's plea bargaining offer and its willingness to approve and accept it.”
Establishes that the trial court's statement about the plea offer was proper administrative procedure, not an improper penalty for rejecting the offer
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChambers and two others were charged with robbery. After his first conviction and successful appeal for a new trial, he was convicted again by jury an…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Herman Chambers, Jr. and two others were taken into custody and by information charged with robbery under Section 813.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. A jury trial resulted in a verdict of guilty. Appellant was sentenced to forty years, with credit for preconviction confinement.
Chambers successfully appealed this conviction and won a new trial.1 This trial by jury likewise resulted in a verdict and judgment of guilty. Appellant again was sentenced to forty years of confinement in the state penitentiary and given credit for time spent in jail pending trial. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to forty years imprisonment when it had offered him twenty-five years for a guilty plea prior to commencement of this second trial. It is urged that the effect of this was to penalize the appellant for his election to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial, and violative of the spirit of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Counsel for appellant, through inadvertence, or otherwise, overlooked the fact that, taken in its total context, the statement by the trial judge, objected to by appellant, clearly indicates that the court, of its own volition and in an abundance of caution and prior to the commencement of the trial, was putting on the record the fact that it was advised of the state’s plea bargaining offer and its willingness to approve and accept it. The state’s offer obviously was not accepted by appellant. Such a statement for the record is eminently proper and correct.2
In any event, the law enunciated in Pearce, supra, has not been violated. Appellant was sentenced to forty years upon his conviction in the first trial and received the same sentence upon his conviction on retrial. The same judge sentenced him on both occasions. Consequently, we find no error here.
Appellant’s other point on appeal does have merit. At sentencing the trial judge pronounced:
. I will give you credit for all time that you have previously built before the appeal and, of course, up to the present time. .
This conforms to the-requirements of the law.3 Notwithstanding the court’s intention to apply the correct law, the administrative paper work reflects that appellant has been given credit only from April 5, 1973, when, according to the record here, his confinement dates back to the early part of 1972.
Accordingly, we direct that the confinement orders be amended to conform with the dictates of the trial judge, well established law and this decision.
Except as indicated above, the judgment and sentence is
Affirmed.
MANN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur. . See Marshall v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1973, 273 So. 2d 412.
. See Rule 3.171(c), OPR, 33 F.S.A. . Simmons v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1969, 217 So. 2d 343.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Marshall v. State, 310 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…ded to the trial court for the purpose of entering a [*56] corrective sentence order giving appellant credit for all the time he had been incarcerated since January 22, 1972, specifying the period of time allowed. Chambers v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 293 So. 2d 752; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Grine v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 301 So. 2d 122; § 921.161(1) F.S. This action may be taken by the trial court without the appellant appearing before the court. The judgment is…
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Levitz v. State, 339 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1976)…ellee, State, contends that in effect Chapter 318.14, Florida Statutes, provides for a type of plea bargaining, a principle not only upheld but also encouraged by the Courts. As was stated by the Second District Court of Appeal in Chambers v. State, 293 So. 2d 752 (Fla.App. 2, 1974), for the trial judge to impose a greater sentence after trial than was agreed upon in a plea bargaining agreement if appellant would plead guilty did not penalize appellant for his election to exercise his constitutional right to…
Authorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969)
- Schreiber v. Schreiber, 217 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Simmons v. State, 217 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Paris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)