CHARLES SIMON, APPELLANT,
v.
SALLY SIMON, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal, the court reversed an order striking portions of the ex-husband's complaint alleging that the dissolution judgment conclusively determined all property rights between the parties and barred the ex-wife from pursuing separate litigation over his real property holdings. The court held that a final dissolution judgment settles all property rights and invokes res judicata, barring subsequent claims.
A final dissolution of marriage judgment settles all property rights of the parties and bars any subsequent action by either party to determine property rights, invoking the doctrine of res judicata. The court's striking of the complaint's allegations asserting this bar was error and was reversed.
[1] A final judgment dissolving a marriage settles all property rights of the parties and bars any subsequent action by either party to determine property rights, provided th…
[2] Property claims must be raised in the dissolution of marriage action, as the doctrine of res judicata applies even if property rights were not explicitly litigated, but c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule is firmly established that as in the case sub judice where the court has acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights, a final dissolution of marriage judgment settles all property rights of the parties and bars any action thereafter by either party to determine property rights.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that a final dissolution judgment conclusively determines property rights and invokes res judicata to bar subsequent litigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn the 1972 dissolution judgment, the chancellor found that the parties owned the marital residence as tenants by the entireties and that the appellan…
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant takes this interlocutory appeal to review an order by which the court on its own motion struck certain portions from plaintiff’s complaint. We reverse.
On March 20, 1972 the chancellor entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties. Contained therein was a specific finding of the court that the parties owned jointly as tenants by the en-tireties, the marital residence and, in addition, that the appellant, ex-husband, owned a number of properties consisting of improved and unimproved real estate in Philadelphia, Pa. which was stipulated to have a net value in excess of $1,000,000 and from which appellant’s actual income was in excess of $20,000 after deducting depreciation, a major portion of which appellant used to provide for his family. Thereupon, the chancellor ordered that the marital residence be sold and the proceeds from the sale thereof be divided equally between the parties, and that appellant pay monthly alimony to the appellee, ex-wife, and monthly child support. No appeal was taken from this judgment. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint in which he sought an injunction to enjoin his ex-wife, the defendant-appellee, from prosecuting seven separate actions involving his real property holdings in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Appellant alleged therein that the chancellor in the dissolution judgment made a finding of fact and an adjudication of property rights whereby appellant was found and determined to be the owner of the Philadelphia real property and as a result thereof, all property rights between him and his ex-wife finally have been determined and adjudicated; therefore, defendant-appellee is precluded and barred from claiming any special equities or other claim with respect to his Philadelphia real estate. In response thereto, defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. However, the court on its own motion struck from the complaint portions of paragraphs S and 8 and paragraphs 6, 10 and 12 in their entirety which alleged that the final judgment of dissolution constituted a final adjudication of the property rights between the parties and barred any further litigation thereof by the defendant. Plaintiff appeals therefrom.
The rule is firmly established that as in the case' sub judice where the court has acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights, a final dissolution of marriage judgment settles all property rights of the parties and bars any action thereafter by either party to determine property rights. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (1948); Smith v. Bollinger, Fla.App.1962, 137 So. 2d 881; Jones v. Jones, Fla.App.1962, 140 So. 2d 318; McEachin v. McEachin, Fla.App. 1963, 154 So. 2d 894; Thompson v. Thompson, Fla.App. 1969, 223 So. 2d 95; Henderson v. Henderson, Fla.App. 1969, 226 So. 2d 699; Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, Fla. App.1973, 277 So. 2d 43. In addition, property claims must be put into issue in the dissolution of marriage action since the doctrine of res judicata is applicable even where property rights are not put into issue, if the issue could have been raised. Finston, supra; Cooper v. Cooper, Fla. 1954, 69 So. 2d 881.
After a close reading of the final judgment of dissolution, it is clear that the property rights of the parties conclusively were determined and settled therein. It is equally dear that the amount of alimony awarded the defendant-appellee, ex-wife, was predicated upon the court’s finding that appellant owned the Philadelphia properties and the annual income he derived therefrom. Thus, we reverse the order striking the portions of appellant’s complaint cited hereinabove and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…26, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979): Ordinarily a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (1948); Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). Property rights not adjudicated on dissolution can be determined later when jurisdiction to do so has been reserved. Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1976); Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. discharge…
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Davis v. Rosman Charles Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1986)…wed in this state. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 980 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1612, 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). However, the Cooper decision was completely overlooked in Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In Vandervoort, contrary to this Court’s decision in…
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Anne Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ttles the property rights of the parties and bars any subsequent action to determine the question of property rights. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1948); Diejuste v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). The doctrine of res judicata precludes litigation of property rights which could have been litigated whether or not they were litigated in the divorce action, Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So. 2d 881 (Fla.1954); compare Vandervoort v. Van…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roslyn S. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935 (Fla. 1948)
- McEACHIN v. Dalton H. McEACHIN, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1954)
- Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Henderson v. Henderson, 226 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Smith v. Bollinger, 137 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Jonhs v. Mozelle N. Jones, 140 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)