ROCKMATT CORPORATION, D/B/A THE MINT LOUNGE ET AL., APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH G. EHRLICH, D/B/A WALLSTREET COMPANY, APPELLEE
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A business broker sought commission from a business seller for procuring a buyer. The jury awarded commission on both the business and real estate, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the broker's agreement covered only the business sale and could not legally include real property commission.
The court held that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find the broker produced a ready, willing, and able buyer, and that the listing agreement was binding as both parties acted upon it and considered it binding until written cancellation. However, the court held that the broker could not legally collect commission on the real property sale, as the employment agreement covered only the business sale, and reversed for a new trial on damages only.
[1] A jury verdict may be reversed if it unlawfully includes a commission for the sale of real property when the broker's employment was only for the sale of a business.
[2] A listing agreement, even if initially signed by an unauthorized officer, may be considered binding if the parties acted upon it and treated it as valid until cancellatio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a verdict for a commission in the full amount of the agreed percentage as applied to both the business and the real estate cannot stand”
The court's holding that the broker cannot legally collect commission on real property when the employment agreement covered only the business sale.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRockmatt Corporation and broker Ehrlich entered into an exclusive listing agreement for sale of Rockmatt's business at a ten percent commission. Ehrli…
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PEARSON, Judge.
The defendant, Rockmatt Corporation, which was the seller of a business and the real estate upon which it was conducted, appeals a final judgment based upon a jury verdict in an action by a business broker for a commission. We hold that the verdict unlawfully included a commission for the sale of the real property and reverse for a new trial on damages only.
The appellee, Ehrlich, and the appellant Rockmatt Corporation entered into an exclusive right of sale listing agreement whereby the appellant agreed to pay a ten per cent commission on the sale of its business. The appellee produced a prospective purchaser who executed a purchase agreement for the agreed purchase price, but the purchaser’s check for deposit was on two occasions returned by the bank with a notation of insufficient funds. Shortly thereafter, the. appellant cancelled the exclusive listing agreement. About four months later, the appellant sold the business for the agreed price less brokerage commission to a corporation in which the prospective purchaser was a principal. On the basis of these facts, the jury returned a verdict for the amount of the agreed commission on both the business and the real estate.
On this appeal, the appellant presents three points. The first urges error upon the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict for the appellant-defendant because there was insufficient evidence to establish that the sale was a result of appellee’s production of a buyer ready, able and willing to purchase the property. See Malever v. Livingston, 95 Fla. 272, 116 So. 15 (1928). Appellant admits that the cause was submitted to the jury upon a proper charge, and our review of the record establishes that the facts were sufficient to carry the issue to the jury. See Oro Verde Groves, Inc. v. Fuchs, Fla.App. 1962, 136 So. 2d 12. See also First Realty Corporation of Boca Raton v. Standard Steel Treating Company, Fla.App.1972, 268 So. 2d 410.
Appellant’s second point urges that a verdict should have been directed because there was never a binding agreement. between the broker and the seller. It is urged that the listing was signed by an unauthorized officer of the appellant corporation. The evidence reveals, however, that the listing agreement was acted upon by the parties and that each party considered it binding until the time that the appellant made a written cancellation thereof. We find that the point is not well taken. See Mellet v. Henry, Fla.App.1959, 108 So. 2d 69.
Appellant’s third point is directed toward including the sale price of the real estate in the calculation of the broker’s commission. See Fla.Stat. § 475.01, F.S.A. See also Community Cablecasting Corporation v. Daniels & Associates, Inc., Fla. App.1968, 215 So. 2d 17. This point is well taken. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff in a trial court to present evidence upon which a reasonably ascertainable amount of damages may be based. See Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Investment Corp., Fla. App.1962, 143 So. 2d 684. Inasmuch as appellee’s employment was only for the sale of the business and he could not legally collect a commission for a sale of the real property, a verdict for a commission in the full amount of the agreed percentage as applied to both the business and the real estate cannot stand. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial as to damages only.
Reversed and remanded.
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United Steel & Strip Corp. v. Monex Corp. & Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 310 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…stimating an amount in money with reasonable certainty. See Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson, Fla.1953, 67 So. 2d 215; Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Investment Corp., Fla.App.1962, 143 So. 2d 684; Rockmatt Corporation v. Ehrlich, Fla.App.1974, 294 So. 2d 412. The plaintiff has failed to establish what portion of the goods was received in bad condition, and therefore, there is no evidence on which to base an award of damages assuming arguendo liability had been established. For the reasons stated and up…
Authorities Cited
- Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Inv. Corp., 143 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- First Realty Corp. OF Boca Raton v. Standard Steel Treating Co., 268 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Malever v. Livingston, 95 Fla. 272 (Fla. 1928)
- Mellet v. Henry, 108 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- ORO Verde Groves, Inc. v. Fuchs, 136 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Lucille Hadley et vir v. Youngblood, 215 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)