ROBERTA BLYNDER, APPELLANT,
v.
BERNARD BLYNDER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order, finding no abuse of discretion in denying a continuance or in awarding attorney's fees.
The former wife appealed a post-divorce order directing her to pay $2,000 in attorney's fees to her ex-husband's counsel. She argued her new counsel l…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ability To Pay cases and more on FLexlaw
HENDRY, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal by the former wife from a post-divorce order by the trial court directing her to pay an attorney’s fee of $2,000 to counsel for her ex-husband.
It is the appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying her motion to defer a hearing on the ex-husband’s petition for attorney’s fees because the wife retained new counsel approximately one week before the hearing and counsel did not have adequate time to prepare for the hearing.
However, it is clear from the record that notice of the hearing was served on appellant’s former counsel approximately nine weeks prior to the hearing. We do not think that under the facts of this case the trial judge has been shown to have abused his discretion by denial of a continuance. See, 7 Fla.Jur. Continuances § 6.
By a second point on appeal, the appellant argues that there is no statutory authority to order her to pay an attorney’s fee and even if there is authority, the court erred by failing to take testimony of the parties’ relative ability to pay the fee.
The fee awarded to counsel for the appellee herein was for services rendered in securing for the four minor children of the parties certain trust funds which were entrusted to the appellant by the final decree of divorce entered on June 7, 1968. Clearly, there is statutory authority supporting the award of an attorney’s fee in this instance. See, Fla.Stat. § 61.16, F.S. A. The appellant has not provided this court with any of the testimony which the trial court heard prior to awarding the husband’s attorney the fee in question. In the absence of a showing that the court abused its discretion by awarding the attorney’s fee, it is not the province of the appellate court to disturb such an award. Therefore, we decline to assume that the trial court failed to consider the relative financial resources of the parties as provided by the statute.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Besade v. Besade, 430 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…rded, because no record of the evidentiary hearing was made nor has any substantial record thereof been provided to the court. Fla.R.App.P. [*928] 9.200(a)(3); Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979); Blynder v. Blynder, 294 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Affirmed.…
-
Gordon C. Brydger, P.A. v. Wolfe, 847 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…attorney is considered as notice to the client); see also Starling v. State, 799 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Woodard v. Fla. State Univ., 518 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Blynder v. Blynder, 294 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Moreover, Calebrese stated at the hearing that, on the morning of the mediation, former wife informed her of the hearing that had taken place on September 29, 2000, and that, as a result, she included the provision for Brydger’s…