METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
TRAMMELL S. CROWE, AS TRUSTEE, APPELLEE
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Metropolitan Dade County appealed a circuit court decision that quashed the County Commission's denial of a zoning amendment application and ordered the county to rezone property from residential to limited business use. The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Commission's decision was based on a fairly debatable matter and was not arbitrary or unsupported by adequate factual basis.
The court held that when a zoning amendment decision is based on a fairly debatable matter, courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body. The applicant bore the burden of showing that the matter was not fairly debatable, which was not met here. The Commission's decision was supported by adequate factual basis and there was no showing of changed circumstances to overcome the administrative res judicata effect of the prior denial.
[1] Amendments to zoning ordinances by a county or municipality are legislative actions.
[2] Courts should not substitute their judgment for that of a legislative body when the matter is fairly debatable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where such legislative action is predicated on a matter that is fairly debatable a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body, by vitiating the legislative action or holding to the contrary on the matter which has been so legislated.”
Establishes the core principle that courts defer to legislative zoning decisions when based on fairly debatable matters
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTrammell Crowe applied to amend Dade County's zoning ordinance to change a parcel of land from RU-4L (apartment houses) to BU-1 (limited business) for…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellee made application for an amendment to the zoning ordinance of Dade County to liberalize the zoning on a parcel of land from RU-4L which permits apartment houses to BU-1 which permits limited business, intending to use the same for business (hamburger restaurant). The County Zoning Appeals Board recommended approval of the application. The County Commission, after hearing and consideration thereof, denied the application. The applicant sought review of that decision by petition for writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court. The court granted certiorari, quashed the Commission’s decision, and directed the County Commission to rezone the parcel as applied for, and to issue a building permit for the proposed business structure. The county appealed.
We find error, and reverse upon the following theory and reasons. The action of a county or of a municipal corporation in amending a zoning ordinance,' as in the enactment of a zoning ordinance, is legislative. Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.1959, 112 So. 2d 838. Where such legislative action is predicated on a matter that is fairly debatable a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body, by vitiating the legislative action or holding to the contrary on the matter which has been so legislated. This is so well established as not to require citation of n'umerous decisions so holding.
It was the burden of the respondent in the trial court to show that the matter upon which the County Commission rendered its decision was not fairly debatable. We hold that burden was not met, in that a review of this record impels us to conclude that the matter was fairly debatable. The parcel involved was in the corner of a tract owned by the appellant. The owner had developed other portions thereof for the permitted apartment house use. There was no adequate showing that this parcel was not so usable, or was not otherwise suitable for a use or uses for which zoned.
Moreover,.the owner had previously made a similar application to have the zoning of the parcel so liberalized, and the application therefor had been denied. There was no showing of changed circumstances apr plicable thereto, since the denial of the prior application, sufficient to overcome the administrative res judicata effect thereof. See City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, Fla.1957, 97 So. 2d 473, 477-478; Metropolitan Dade County v. Rockmatt Corp., Fla.App.1970, 231 So. 2d 41.
On the evidence before the Commission we do not find basis to hold the decision of the County Commission was without adequate factual support, or that it was other than based on a matter that was fairly debatable. We hold no valid reason in law was presented in the trial court to prompt or require that the decision of the County Commission in this matter be quashed. See City of St. Petersburg v. Aiken, Fla. 1968, 217 So. 2d 315.
The judgment is reversed.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- City OF ST. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1968)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957)
- Schauer v. City OF Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)