SUSAN M. GUE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was charged originally with possession of marijuana in an amount constituting a misdemeanor. The state nolle prossed this charge and filed a felony charge for possession of narcotics paraphernalia, but failed to bring appellant to trial within 180 days of the date when appellant was “taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.” CrPR 3.-191(a)(1), 33 F.S.A. We find nothing in this record to constitute an exception to the speedy trial rule. While it is true, as the trial judge pointed out, that at arraignment the defendant might have called to the state’s attention that the case was set for trial beyond the 180 days, we find nothing in the rule which places the burden of compliance elsewhere than on the state. There being no waiver or other circumstances justifying extension, denial of the motion to discharge was error. See State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 470; cf. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, Fla.App.2d 1973, 279 So. 2d 362, in which the delay was attributable to the accused, a circumstance not shown on this record.
Reversed.
MANN, C. J., and McNULTY and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
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Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)…BOYD, Justice. By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District (Stuart v. State, 339 So. 2d 659), which conflicts with decisions in Gue v. State, 297 So. 2d 135 (Fla.2d DCA 1974) and State ex rel. Flowers v. Goodman, 241 So. 2d 457 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). We have jurisdiction, pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. After being taken into custody on November 8, 1974, petitioner was informe…
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State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…l is within the speedy trial rule. “The record does not affirmatively show that the defendant or her attorney agreed to the date in question. For this reason, the motion for discharge is granted as to count three of the information.” Gue v. State, 297 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974), is on point. There, Gue had originally been charged with a misdemeanor for possession of marijuana. Subsequently, the state nolle prossed the original charge and filed a felony charge for possession of narcotic paraphernalia. Ho…
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Bulgin v. State, 912 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2005)….] Nesbitt, [355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ] the fact that the charge was changed from a felony to a misdemeanor and then back to a felony did not alter the running of the speedy trial period from the original arrest date. See also Gue v. State, 297 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In [State ex rel. Williams v.] Cowart, [281 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) ] there was a mistrial, after which charges were amended. After the expiration of the 90 days under Rule 3.191(g), the state attempted to nolle prosequi on…
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- State of Fla. ex rel. Juan Gutierrez v. Honorable Paul Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)