ROBBIE E. BOONE, APPELLANT,
v.
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLEE
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Robbie Boone appealed the dismissal of his declaratory judgment action challenging the state's termination of his welfare benefits. The court held that review of quasi-judicial agency decisions must proceed by certiorari petition, not declaratory judgment actions, and affirmed the dismissal.
The court held that certiorari is the exclusive method of appellate review for final orders entered by a state agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial authority, and that declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of review for such decisions. Declaratory judgment is available only for challenging agency 'rules' of general applicability, not 'rulings' applying only to specific parties in individual quasi-judicial proceedings.
[1] Review of an administrative order that is quasi-judicial in character must be sought by certiorari proceedings, not by a declaratory judgment action.
[2] A declaratory judgment action is not available to challenge a ruling made by an agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellant's only method of review was by certiorari and not by an action for declaratory judgment”
States the core holding that certiorari is the exclusive remedy for quasi-judicial agency decisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Boone received welfare assistance that was stopped by the Division of Family Services. He received a fair hearing on the matter where he app…
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JOHNSON, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment, which petition sought a determination of whether the appellee lawfully stopped payments of welfare assistance to him.
The sole question for our determination is whether appellant’s mode of review was one of declaratory judgment proceedings or one of certiorari proceedings. We agree with the trial court and hold that appellant’s only method of review was by certiorari and not by an action for declaratory judgment. Appellant is seeking review of an administrative order which is unquestionably quasi-judicial in character. The ruling in question was made pursuant to F.S. § 409.285, F.S.A., a statute requiring notice ánd a fair hearing. Appellant requested and received a fair hearing at which he appeared personally with his attorney and presented evidence in support of his position. F.S. § 120.31, F.S.A., clearly provides for the method of appellate review of final orders entered by a state agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, and that method is by certiorari in the district courts of appeal. Also see Board of Public Instruction of Duval County v. Sack, 212 So. 2d 819 (Fla.App. 1st, 1968). While F.S. § 120.30, F.S.A., authorizes a person to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of a rule, the term “rule” referred to in said section
“was intended to apply only to a rule or order promulgated by the agency in the exercise of its quasi-legislative authority having a general application and which uniformly affects the rights of the public .... This is to be distinguished from a ‘ruling’ which is an order rendered by the agency in the conduct of a quasi-judicial proceeding which applies only to the issues in that proceeding and affects only the parties thereto [as to which ruling there would be no right to a judicial declaration under Section 120.30, F.S.]” (Emphasis supplied). Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So. 2d 69 (Fla.App. 4th, 1969).
Also see Meiklejohn v. American Distributors, Inc., 210 So. 2d 259 (Fla.App. 1st, 1968); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So. 2d 609 (Fla.App. 1st, 1962).
Clearly, the order sought to be reviewed herein was a “ruling” entered by a state agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, and not a “rule” as contemplated by F.S. § 120.30, F.S.A. Accordingly, the final judgment dismissing appellant’s action for a declaratory judgment is affirmed.
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Meiklejohn v. Am. Distribs., Inc., 210 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Polar ICE Cream & Creamery Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 146 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- The Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Duval Cnty. v. The Honorable Martin Sack, 212 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Reed v. Hayden Stone, Inc., 212 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)