MARY LEE SMITH, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF LEVI SMITH, AND MARY LEE SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANT,
v.
AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., A CORPORATION, AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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In a wrongful death action arising from a truck crash allegedly caused by mechanical defects in a leased vehicle, the court reversed summary judgment granted to the defendant rental company and insurer, holding that the defendants failed to meet their burden of conclusively showing no material issues of fact for trial.
The defendants did not meet their burden on summary judgment. The party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively that no material issues of fact remain for trial, which is a greater burden than the plaintiff's burden at trial. The conflicting evidence concerning the mechanical defect and causation created material factual issues that precluded summary judgment.
[1] A party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively that no material issues remain for trial.
[2] The burden on a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not as heavy as the burden at trial.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The basic error in both the Holl case and the instant case consisted of the failure of the lower courts to distinguish adequately between the plaintiff's burden at the trial and that which he bore as the party opposing a motion for summary judgment.”
Establishes the fundamental distinction between burdens at trial versus on summary judgment motions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff's decedent was killed when a truck he was driving crashed into a guardrail. A surviving passenger testified that the decedent lost contr…
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GRIMES, Judge.
The plaintiff’s decedent was killed when the truck he was driving crashed into a guardrail of the Howard Frankland Bridge. In his deposition, a surviving passenger said that the decedent lost control of the vehicle when a “ball of fire rolled out” from the area of the ignition. The truck was leased by Avis to the decedent’s employer. Avis retained full responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the truck and conducted minor maintenance upon it daily. The existence of electric sparks coming from the ignition had previously been made known to Avis, and a leak in a gasoline line near the driver’s seat had also been reported. An affidavit of a mechanic was filed in which it was said that assuming the accuracy of the passenger’s testimony, it was his opinion that “there was a mechanical defect in the truck which caused the fire described.” Avis’ service manager testified that it would be impossible for fire to come up through the ignition as described by the eyewitness. In granting a summary judgment to the defendants, the trial court said:
“. . . There should be some evidence indicating in what particular the Defendant has failed to use reasonable care, i. e., in the language of the definition ‘that it failed to do something that a reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances.’ The record is to the contrary. . . .”
We believe the court misconstrued the burden which is applicable to a motion for summary judgment. In Visingardi v. Tirone, Fla.1966, 193 So. 2d 601, the Supreme Court said:
“The basic error in both the Holl case [Holl v. Talcott, Fla.App., 171 So. 2d 412], supra, and the instant case consisted of the failure of the lower courts to distinguish adequately between the plaintiff’s burden at the trial and that which he bore as the party opposing a motion for summary judgment. In both cases, the lower courts appeared to proceed as though the movant’s burden in the latter circumstance were something less than to show conclusively that no material issues remained for trial. The result, of course, was to place upon the opposing party a heavier burden of showing such triable issues than the rule either requires or allows to be placed upon him.”
The Supreme Court then summarized its position by saying:
“. . .In other words, the burden of a party moving for summary judgment is greater, not less, than that of the plaintiff at the trial. The plaintiff may prevail on the basis of a mere preponderance of the evidence. However, the party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively that no material issues remain for trial. . . .”
We do not think it necessary to discuss the plaintiff’s theories of recovery. For purposes of summary judgment, the defendants failed to carry the burden of conclusively showing no material issues of fact.
The summary judgment is reversed.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN, J., concur.
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Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…ic inspections of the premises. Thus, Holton has not satisfied his summary judgment burden of demonstrating that he had no reason to anticipate the presence of police officers in his building. Smith v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., Fla.App.2d, 1974, 297 So. 2d 841. Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, if assumption of the risk is still an absolute bar to liability in Florida, Hol-ton makes a persuasive argument that the doctrine precludes recovery by Hall as a matter of law. The question posed is whether…
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Leib v. City OF Tampa, 326 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…s from the evidence, it cannot be said “ . . . that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” RCP Rule 1.510. As we stated in Smith v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Fla.App.2d 1974, 297 So. 2d 841, the moving party must show conclusively that no material issues remain for trial in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1 McNULTY, C. J., and H…
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Anderson v. Toole, 329 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…o the use and enjoyment of their lands. In order to obtain a summary judgment in this case, the burden was upon the defendants to show conclusively that there were no material issues of fact. Smith v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., Fla,App.2d, 1974, 297 So. 2d 841. Whether the plaintiffs’ use of the easement was of a sufficient character as to constitute an ad [*35] verse use cannot be answered until the surrounding facts and circumstances have been fully developed. Hunt Land Holding Company v. Schramm, supra…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1966)
- Holl v. Talcott, 171 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)