STEPHEN DOUGLAS WEEKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Stephen Douglas Weeks appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of his guilty plea. The court affirmed his conviction, holding that because Weeks was imprisoned for another crime when charged, it was legally debatable whether the speedy trial rule would have entitled him to discharge before he entered his guilty plea.
The court held that the record is sufficient to refute Weeks's contention that he was improperly advised because it was legally debatable whether he would have been entitled to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule given that he was already in custody for another crime when the rule's transitional period cutoff date of September 27, 1971 applied.
[1] A defendant already in custody for one crime is not necessarily excluded from the transitional period provisions of the Speedy Trial Rule for a new charge.
[2] A negotiated guilty plea is not improperly induced when the legal entitlement to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule is debatable at the time of the plea.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the earliest point in time at which his speedy trial period would have commenced under CrPR 1.191(b)(1) [now 3.191(b)(1)] would have been in July of 1970”
Establishes when Weeks's speedy trial period began relative to his imprisonment for another crime
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1970, Weeks was imprisoned in a Florida correctional institution serving a sentence for another crime. He was charged with a crime of violence but …
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PER CURIAM.
Upon a review of the record and briefs filed in this cause we initially decided to affirm on the authority of Tillman v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1973, 287 So. 2d 639, cert. dismissed, Fla., 285 So. 2d 417, 617, the cases cited therein, and Bankston v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1973, 279 So. 2d 326. However, in light of the dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge Mann, we feel constrained to add the following:
In 1970, appellant was imprisoned in a correctional institution in the State of Florida, serving a sentence for the commission of another crime. Upon the promulgation of the Speedy Trial Rule in 1971, the record reflects that the earliest point in time at which his speedy trial period would have commenced under CrPR 1.191(b)(1) [now 3.191(b)(1)] would have been in July of 1970. Since he was charged with a crime of violence and had not moved for a speedy trial, the time within which he could have been tried would have run until July of 1972, unless it could be said that the cutoff date for trials during the transitional period of the Speedy Trial Rule (September 27, 1971) applied, not only to one in custody for the crime for which he was entitled to a speedy trial, but, also, to one already in custody for another crime. Thus, when he entered his plea on April 20, 1972, it was legally debatable whether he would have been entitled to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule. Consequently, the record is sufficient to refute the appellant’s contention that he was improperly advised to enter a negotiated plea of guilty whereby the state nolle prossed two of four counts.
Affirmed.
BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur. MANN, C. J., dissents with opinion.
MANN, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
This appeal was taken from summary denial without evidentiary hearing of a petition for post conviction relief. Weeks 'states that at the time he was advised by the public defender to plead guilty to some of the charges against him, he was not advised that he had an absolute right to discharge under CrPR 3.191. In Tillman we considered the adequacy of the record which was before us on direct appeal. On that record the guilty plea was sufficiently supported. This case presents solely the question of the adequacy of a charge of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bankston is inapposite in this connection. That was a case in which a charge against counsel was directed toward tactical decisions at trial. At the very minimum, Weeks is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was deprived of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The record before us does not refute this claim, and that is the only circumstance upon which a petition filed under CrPR 3.8S0 may be summarily denied without evidentiary hearing.
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Cited By
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Blanchard v. State, 758 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Cambrick v. State, 593 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Weeks v. State, 298 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). COBB, W. SHARP, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Bankston v. State, 279 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Bennett v. State, 285 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1973)