VIRGINIA WINCHESTER JORDAN ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
STANLEY L. KELSON ET AL., APPELLEES
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Vehicle owners challenged summary judgment in a lawsuit arising from a negligent accident caused by an auto repair shop employee driving their car. The appellate court reversed, holding that vehicle owners can be vicariously liable for accidents caused by anyone operating their vehicle with the owner's knowledge and consent, even if the operator is an employee of a repair shop.
The owner of a motor vehicle who allows another to operate the vehicle with the owner's knowledge and consent, whether express or implied, is vicariously liable for injuries to third persons resulting from the operator's negligence on a public highway.
[1] An owner of a motor vehicle is liable for injuries to a third party caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle on a public highway by another person operating it wi…
[2] Vicarious liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a third party is based on the owner's consent and the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, not on res…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a well established doctrine in Florida that a motor vehicle when operated on a public highway is to be regarded as a dangerous instrumentality.”
Establishes the foundational principle that vehicles are classified as dangerous instrumentalities in Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Kelsons owned a 1969 Chevrolet that they delivered to Cornell and Sons Automobile Repair Shop for repairs. After repairs were completed, the repai…
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CROSS, Judge.
Appcllants-plaintiffs, Virginia Winchester Jordan, Bruce Jordan, a minor, by and through his father and next friend, Ernest Jordan, and Ernest Jordan, individually, appeal a final judgment entered in favor of the appellecs-defendants, Stanley L. Kelson and Wclthy M. Kelson, in a cause of action seeking damages resulting from an automobile accident. We reverse.
Defendants, Stanley L. Kelson and Wel-thy M. Kelson, were owners of a 1969 Chevrolet. On the morning of July 12, 1972, Mrs. Kelson delivered the automobile to Cornell and Sons Automobile Repair Shop for repairs. That evening, after repairs had been completed, defendant Daniel Cornell called Mrs. Kelson and advised her that the car could be picked up. When Mrs. Kelson indicated that it would be difficult for her to come to the repair shop to get the automobile, Cornell agreed to deliver the vehicle to Mrs. Kelson at her home. While en route to the Kelson residence, Cornell, driving the Kelson automobile, was involved in an accident with an automobile owned by plaintiff, Ernest Jordan. The occupants of the Jordan vehicle, Virginia Winchester Jordan and her son, Bruce Jordan, suffered various injuries from the collision.
Subsequently, suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants, Carl Cornell and Daniel Cornell, a partnership doing business as Cornell and Son; Stanley L. Kelson and his wife, Welthy M. Kelson; and Allstate Insurance Company, the Kel-son’s insurer. Various pretrial motions were made and depositions taken. The defendants Kelson and Allstate Insurance Company each moved for a summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions and entered summary final judgment in favor of the Kelsons and Allstate Insurance Company. This appeal then followed.
The question submitted for our determination in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in entering summary final judgments in favor of the Kelsons and Allstate Insurance Company determining that an owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for damages to a third party arising out of the negligent operation of the vehicle on a public highway by an automobile repair shop employee.
It is a well established doctrine in Florida that a motor vehicle when operated on a public highway is to be regarded as a dangerous instrumentality. The owner of a motor vehicle who allows another to operate said motor vehicle with the owner’s knowledge and consent, implied or express, is liable for an injury to a third person occurring on a public highway as a result of the operator’s negligence. This form of vicarious liability is not based on respondeat superior or an agency conception, but on the practical fact that the owner of an instrumentality which had the capability of causing death or destruction should in justice answer for misuse of this instrumentality by anyone operating it with his knowledge and consent. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
Accordingly, the summary final judgments entered in favor of the defendants Kelson and Allstate Insurance Company are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
MAGER, J., and SMITH, D. C., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1978)…l thereof, is at the time acting willfully, wantonly, and in disobedience to his master’s order the public safety demands that he shall be answerable for the exercise of his servant’s judgment.’ ” The correct reasoning is found in Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), where the court said: “It is a well established doctrine in Florida that a motor vehicle when operated on a public highway is to be regarded as a dangerous instrumentality. The owner of a motor vehicle who allows another to ope…1 / 2
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Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984)…as] the capability of causing death or destruction should in justice answer for misuse of this instrumentality by anyone operating it with his knowledge and consent. Southern Cotton Oil v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). There is no question that vehicles other than automobiles can qualify as such instrumentalities, and indeed, the doctrine in Florida has not been so limited. In later years it has been applied to trucks, buses, tow-motors…
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Rippy v. Shepard, 80 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 2012)…which [has] the capability of causing death or destruction should in justice answer for misuse of this instrumentality by anyone operating it with his knowledge and consent.” Meister, 462 So. 2d at 1072 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)). When we first applied the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to an automobile in Southern Cotton Oil Co., we examined at length the dangerous character of the automobile as operated on the public highways. S. Cotton Oil C…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
- S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 (Fla. 1920)