WM. R. KENAN AND SCOTT M. LOFTIN, AS RECEIVERS OF FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY,
v.
GEORGIA HOUSTOUN, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, O. K. HOUSTOUN

Fla. | 1942-04-10
BROWN, C. J., CHAPMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
150 Fla. 357 Florida Supreme Court (1942) Caution
Also reported at: 7 So. 2d 837
Cited by 17 cases

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Synopsis

Georgia Houstoun was injured on a railroad station platform in Jacksonville when steam from a neighboring Louisville and Nashville engine struck her, causing her to fall. The Florida Supreme Court reversed a $4,500 judgment against the Florida East Coast Railway, holding that the FEC was not responsible for injuries caused by a third party's negligent act, absent any duty breach or foreseeable harm.


Holding

The Florida East Coast Railway was not liable for the injury because the negligent act was committed by a third party (L. and N. Railway), and the FEC neither was responsible for the act nor could have reasonably foreseen and prevented the accident through ordinary care. A railroad owes a duty to maintain reasonably safe facilities for passengers, but is not liable for injuries caused by unforeseeable third-party negligence.


Key Quotes

“unless said company or its agents were in some way responsible or could have foreseen and prevented the accident, it cannot be held responsible for injury caused by the negligent act of a third person”

Establishes the standard that a railroad is not liable for third-party negligence absent foreseeability or involvement

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Facts & Procedural History

Mrs. Houstoun was a passenger on a Florida East Coast train traveling from Miami to Jacksonville. Upon arrival, she exited the train and stood on the …

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, J.:

TERRELL, J.:

Georgia Houstoun was a passenger on a Florida East Coast train from Miami to Jacksonville. On arriving in the latter city she descended from the train to the station platform where steam was being ejected from a Louisville and Nashville engine standing on a track parallel to that on which her train was standing, under which it (steam) passed striking her about the lower legs and feet causing her to move about rapidly and in so doing fell over baggage, was thrown to the platform and thereby sustained injuries.

*359This action was brought for personal injuries claiming damages for leaving the platform in an unsafe condition, for permitting plaintiff to leave the train and for the negligence of the engine on the parallel track in ejecting the steam. A trial resulted in a judgment for $4500 in favor of the plaintiff which was affirmed by the Circuit Court. That judgment is here for review on certiorari.

The first and essential question presented is whether or not under the facts stated the Florida East Coast or the L. and N. Railroad was responsible for the alleged injury to the plaintiff.

The evidence shows that Mrs. Houstoun engaged passage on and left the Florida East Coast train when it arrived in Jacksonville and while standing on the platform, received the injuries complained of because of steam escaping from the L. and N. engine standing on a parallel track. It is also shown that the platform was dry and the station facilities in good condition.

It appears admitted that the presumption statute (Section 7051, Compiled General Laws of 1927, does not aid the plaintiff in this case. In this situation, the railroad company is required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care in keeping its station and other premises in condition. When it appears that the agency which caused the injury was other than defendant or its agents the plaintiff must prove that defendant knew or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known of it in time to remove the cause of the injury. 10 Am. Jur. 173, C. and O. Ry. Co. v. Burton, 50 Fed. (2nd) 731.

It is settled law that under the facts stated the Florida East Coast was bound to furnish Mrs. Houstoun reasonably safe facilities for leaving the train and *360to remain in the station but unless said company or its agents were in some way responsible or could have foreseen and prevented the accident, it cannot be held responsible for injury caused by the negligent act of a third person. In this case, the L. and N. Railway was the third person and we think was responsible for the accident. It was in no way attributable to the negligence of petitioner nor do we know of any criterion by which it could have been put on notice of it. It had not happened before and the character of it was of such a nature that it could not have been reasonably foreseen.

As to liability on the ground of joint user, the rule is that the carrier or carriers are responsible if their station and approaches are not kept in a reasonably safe condition for the use of passengers. In other words, the rule as previously stated is extended to each carrier who may individually be held liable for injury to passengers. The injury must result from the negligent upkeep of premises where there is a joint responsibility to do so.

In this case, there was no showing in failure of joint or several responsibility to keep the station and approaches in reasonably safe condition. Neither was there showing of negligence on the part of the Florida East Coast but such as there was was on the part of the L. and N. and while it happens to have been committed within the passenger yard, the controlling principle is no different than if committed at a grade crossing or some other remote point.

Other questions raised have been examined but discussion of them would be pretermitted except for their importance in a new trial. We have reached the conclusion that refusal to permit the evidence offered in *361the sixth question to be introduced was harmful error. The evidence cottiplained of in the third question was also harmful but the other errors complained of are found to be without merit.

Writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment below is quashed.

It is so ordered.

BROWN, C. J., CHAPMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Homan v. Cnty. OF Dade, 248 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
    …nably foreseeable occurrence, and that defendant subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm by not equipping its passenger car with laminated safety glass. See Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 84 Fla. 9, 93 So. 151; Kenan v. Houstoun, 150 Fla. 357, 7 So. 2d 837; Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 5 Cir. 1959, 266 F. 2d 326. In Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, discussing Florida law stated as follows (266 F. 2d at 331):…
  • Rae Kaufman v. A-1 BUS Lines, Inc., 363 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …appellee, there must have been some showing of negligence on its part; here, there was none. Under these circumstances, it is clear that appellee owed no duty to appellant in regard to the injuries which she sustained. See, e. g., Kenan v. Houston, 150 Fla. 357, 7 So. 2d 837 (1942); and Carlton v. Miami Transit Co., 147 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Compare Stevenson v. Four Winds Travel, Inc., 462 F. 2d 899 (5th Cir. 1972). In the light of our determination above, we believe that the trial court properl…
  • E. Airlines, Inc. v. Dixon, 310 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
    …1962, 141 So. 2d 343. Eastern submits that the duty which it owed to the appellees under the circumstances of the instant case was simply that of ordinary and reasonable care which any business might owe to an invitee. See, Kenan v. Houstoun, 1942, 150 Fla. 357, 7 So. 2d 837. Appellant further argues that as a common carrier it is required to exercise the highest degree of care “only to passengers who are in the actual course of travel or who are boarding or alighting.” See, Federal Insurance Co. v. Bonil…

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