JESSIE HAYWOOD MANNING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Manning was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years without credit for pretrial jail time. The court reversed and remanded because the trial judge failed to comply with Florida Statute 921.161(1), which required crediting all time spent in county jail before sentencing.
The sentence was improper and violated Florida Statute 921.161(1) because the trial court failed to provide credit for pretrial jail time and failed to make the findings necessary to impose an extended sentence under Florida Statute 775.084.
[1] A court imposing a sentence of imprisonment must allow the defendant credit for all time spent in county jail before sentencing, and this credit must be specified in the…
[2] A sentence of imprisonment cannot begin to run before the date it is imposed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence.”
Establishes the mandatory statutory requirement to credit pretrial jail time, which the trial court violated.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceManning was found guilty of manslaughter by jury verdict on September 5, 1973. The trial judge imposed a 15-year sentence on October 5, 1973, explicit…
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BOYER, Judge.
Following a verdict by which appellant was found guilty of manslaughter on September 5, 1973, the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law, saying:
“Based upon the verdict of the jury, finding you guilty of manslaughter, the Court now adjudges you guilty of that offense. It’s the judgment of the law and the sentence of this Court that you be committed to the Division of Corrections of the State of Florida for confinement for a period of 15 years. You are not to be given credit on this sentence for any days that you might have served prior to this in the county jail.”
Chapter 73-71, Laws of Florida, became effective May 28, 1973. It amended Florida Statute 921.161(1), F.S.A., to read as follows:
“A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall he provided for in the sentence. (Emphasis in the original act)
Following the statement above quoted, judgment and sentence was entered on October 5, 1973, the sentence being as follows :
“Inquiry having been made of the defendant why sentence should not now be imposed and the defendant saying nothing that could influence the Court in its decision, it is further ADJUDGED that said defendant be imprisoned by confinement in the Florida State Prison for a term of Fifteen (15) years. No credit for jail time. To run consecutive to prior sentences.”
It is apparent, therefore, that unless Florida Statute 775.084, F.S.A., is applicable, the challenged sentence is contrary to Florida Statute 921.161(1), F.S.A., as amended.
Florida Statute 775.084, F.S.A., provides for the imposition of an extended sentence upon findings by the court of cer tain facts as therein recited. In order for an extended sentence to be imposed under said statute it is imperative that the court make such findings. An examination of the record before us fails to reveal such findings by the court, therefore it appears that the sentence was not intended to have been imposed under said Florida Statute 775.084, F.S.A. Accordingly, it is apparent that the challenged sentence is not in accordance with the applicable law. This case is therefore reversed and remanded to the lower court with directions that such evidence be taken as is necessary to properly compute the “jail time” for which the appellant is entitled to credit and that the sentence imposed be amended accordingly.
RAWLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
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Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…ally provides that “[t]he credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.” We have recently considered this point in Joins v. State, Fla.App.1st 1974, 287 So. 2d 742 and in Manning v. State, Fla.App.lst 1974, 299 So. 2d 632. It is apparent that the court’s statement above quoted did not meet the test of those cases nor the cited statute. Appellant urges that he is entitled to credit for the period of time he was incarcerated in the State of Ohio. We are not unmindful…