RAYMOND JOSEPH GALLAGHER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1974-09-20
No. 74-638
OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
300 So. 2d 299 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1974)

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Holding

The court held that the appellant is entitled to credit for presentence jail time based on a subsequently enacted statute.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment. He moved for credit for time spent in jail prior to sentencing, which was d…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was adjudged guilty of a crime and sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law. He had spent time in jail prior thereto and so moved the trial court for credit for his presentence jail time, which motion was denied. He appeals. We reverse.

Subsequent to the trial court denial F.S. 921.161(1) (1973) was enacted. Different from the prior law allowing the trial court discretion, it provided mandatory credit for jail time served prior to sentencing. Applying the law which obtains at the time of the appeal, we reverse with respectful directions to re-sentence the appellant in accordance with the mentioned statute. See Joins v. State, 287 So. 2d 742 (2d D.C. A.Fla.1973).

On another tack, we would agree with the observation contained in the State’s brief:

“Since Appellant received the statutory maximum sentence, allowable of five years, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 26 L.Ed.2d 586, 90 S.Ct. 2018 (1970), might afford Appellant the relief he seeks if he were to establish that the period of time he spent in jail prior to sentencing was due solely to his inability to meet bond.”

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.


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