JACOB VINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jacob Vinson was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit grand larceny while armed with a knife. He appealed contending the state failed to prove he intended to steal property worth $100 or more, but the Florida appellate court affirmed, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of the requisite intent.
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of intent to commit grand larceny. Although proof of original purchase price alone was insufficient to establish market value of stolen items, the combination of circumstances—including the presence of additional valuable items on the premises, the breaking into a strong box, searched drawers, and Vinson being interrupted before completing his mission—was sufficient to prove the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] Evidence of the original purchase price of stolen items is generally insufficient to prove market value at the time of theft.
[2] Intent to commit grand larceny may be established by evidence of the market value of stolen property or by other evidence or circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such intent may be shown ". . . either by evidence of the market value of what was actually stolen or by 'other evidence or circumstances.'"”
Establishes the legal standard that intent for grand larceny can be proven through means other than the value of items actually stolen.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVinson broke into a dwelling house armed with a knife and stole property. He was apprehended shortly after the crime was reported, and several stolen …
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
By amended information Vinson was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, to wit: grand larceny, while armed with a dangerous weapon. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to fifty years in prison.
The evidence is overwhelming that appellant did break and enter with intent to steal property of some value while armed with a knife, and that he did, in fact, steal some property. He was apprehended shortly after the crime was reported and several items of stolen property were found in' his vehicle.
Appellant contends that the evidence did not sufficiently show that he had intent to steal property of the value of $100 or more. Such intent may be shown “. . . either by evidence of the market value of what was actually stolen or by ‘other evidence or circumstances.’ ” Platt v. State, Fla.App.2nd 1974, 291 So. 2d 96. The state introduced into evidence the stolen items found in appellant’s possession to prove the appellant’s intent. However, in attempting to prove the value of these items the state proved only the original purchase price. In the ordinary case, evidence of the original purchase price is not sufficient to prove the market value of the stolen property at the time of the theft. Adams v. State, Fla.App.1st 1971, 242 So. 2d 723; Todd v. State, Fla.App.3rd 1966, 187 So. 2d 908.
Had the items introduced been the only evidence of the appellant’s intent, we would be constrained to agree with appellant that the requisite intent had not been established. However, a review of the record does reflect other evidence from which the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the requisite intent to commit grand larceny. The record reveals first that there were additional items of value on the premises. In addition, the evidence shows that a strong box was broken into which contained only non-negotiable securities, drawers were searched, and that appellant was prevented from completing whatever his mission may have been by the return of the occupants of the dwelling. The trial judge, in a bench conference, stated that the appellant “. . . was flushed out.” The record supports his observation. This combination of circumstances, in our judgment, is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that there was an intent to steal goods of a value in excess of one hundred dollars.
The other points raised by the appellant are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment appealed is
Affirmed. HOBSON, A. C. J., concurs.
GRIMES, J., concurs specially with opinion.
GRIMES, Judge
(concurring specially):
With all due respect, I do not believe the record supports the conclusion that the appellant was thwarted in his efforts by the return of the occupants of the dwelling. However, I am persuaded that the breaking into the strong box and the rifling of the dresser drawers manifested an intent to steal property worth more than $100. These facts cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Walker v. State, Fla.1902, 44 Fla. 466, 32 So. 954. Sufficient “circumstances” were proven to support a reasonable inference that when he entered the house, appellant intended to take more than what he actually did take. Guerrero v. State, Fla. 1974, 289 So. 2d 396.
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Citator
Cited By
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Pickett v. State, 839 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…2001) (recognizing the Neg-ron factors to establish fair market value for restitution purposes). Testimony solely as to the cost of the property is insufficient to establish value at the time of the theft. Negron, 306 So. 2d at 108; Vinson v. State, 300 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Because the State only established the purchase price for the items and there was no evidence establishing their value at the time of the theft, we reverse the conviction and sentence for grand theft and remand for entry of…
Authorities Cited
- Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. Carr, 187 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Platt v. State, 291 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Guerrero v. State, 289 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1974)
- Walker v. State, 44 Fla. 466 (Fla. 1902)
- Kimmons v. State, 242 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Adams v. State, 242 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)