MARCIA D. PROTHEROE, APPELLANT,
v.
M. VINCENT PROTHEROE, APPELLEE
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A former wife appealed a trial court's order modifying a final divorce decree by terminating her alimony payments in one year. The appellate court reversed, holding that absent significant changes in financial circumstances, alimony based on a stipulation should not be terminated so abruptly, and remanded for a phase-out period of three years.
Although the trial court had legal authority to modify the final decree and reduce alimony, it erred in terminating alimony after only one year without substantial changes in financial circumstances. The court should have phased out the alimony over three years from May 1, 1973, providing the wife adequate time to become self-supporting.
[1] A trial court has the legal authority to modify a final decree of dissolution of marriage regarding alimony payments.
[2] A trial court may err in cutting off alimony payments prematurely, especially when the final decree was based on a stipulation and there has been no significant change in…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree that the trial court had the legal authority to modify the Final Decree and to reduce the alimony payments, but by the time the orderly process of this appeal had reached this point, and because we are somewhat reluctant to grant such relief so quickly when the final decree was based on a stipulation and admittedly without any change in financial circumstances, we are of the opinion that, taking the record as a whole, that the trial court was in error in cutting off the alimony at the date of May 1, 1974.”
Establishes the appellate court's reasoning: while modification authority exists, abrupt termination without significant circumstantial changes contradicts proper application of alimony law.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' final decree fixing alimony was based on a stipulation dated October 18, 1971. At the modification hearing, both parties presented eviden…
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JOHNSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, wherein the Court modified the final decree of dissolution of marriage by limiting the alimony payments to May 1, 1974, which was one year from the Order. The Final Decree fixing the alimony payments was based upon a stipulation between the parties, dated October 18, 1971. In the case, sub judice, the evidence from both parties was to the effect that the wife’s expenses for her and their minor son, were about the same as they were when the stipulation was entered into, except for cost of living increase, and that the husband’s income was about the same. The only difference in the status of the parties is that the husband had remarried a lady with two minor children from a previous marriage.
We agree that the trial court had the legal authority to modify the Final Decree and to reduce the alimony payments, but by the time the orderly process of this appeal had reached this point, and because we are somewhat reluctant to grant such relief so quickly when the final decree was based on a stipulation and admittedly without any change in financial circumstances, we are of the opinion that, taking the record as a whole, that the trial court was in error in cutting off the alimony at the date of May 1, 1974. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court for an order phasing out the alimony at the end of three years from May 1, 1973, which would give the appellant ample time to prepare herself for making a living.
Attorney’s fees in the amount of $300.00 is awarded to the attorney for the appellant.
Reversed in part and remanded.
RAWLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
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Protheroe v. Protheroe, 328 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1976)…OVERTON, Chief Justice. Certiorari was initially granted in this cause because of an apparent conflict between the instant decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 300 So. 2d 748 (Fla.App. 1st 1974), and Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla.1954), Gamse v. Gamse, 291 So. 2d 620 (Fla.App. 3d 1974), and DeFrancisco v. DeFrancisco, 273 So. 2d 780 (Fla.App. 2d 1973). The issue concerns the modification of an award of alimony…
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Protheroe v. Protheroe, 332 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…e of society than in the individual circumstances of the two parties.” The final judgment was modified to provide for alimony in the sum of $325.00 per month through May 1, 1974. Upon appeal to this Court (Protheroe v. Protheroe, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 300 So. 2d 748), we said: “The Final Decree fixing the alimony payments was based upon a stipulation between the parties, dated October 18, 1971. In the case, sub judice, the evidence from both parties was to the effect that the wife’s expenses for her and their…1 / 2