IN RE ESTATE OF BARNET STEIN, DECEASED. BARBARA ABRAMS ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DOROTHY JACOBSON, AS EXECUTRIX OF ESTATE OF BARNET STEIN, APPELLEE
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This appeal addresses whether beneficiaries who filed a disclaimer of unqualified language could still inherit under a will they sought to revoke. The court held that a disclaimer need not use specific magic words to be considered qualified if its intent was merely to comply with statutory requirements, allowing the beneficiaries to take under the will despite their unqualified disclaimer language.
A qualified renunciation need not contain specific magic words; rather, the intent behind the renunciation is determinative. When a renunciation is made solely to comply with statutory requirements and no further purpose is intended, it must be considered qualified, and the beneficiaries are entitled to take under the will.
[1] A disclaimer filed pursuant to Fla.Stat. …
[2] A renunciation of interest in a will is considered qualified when it is intended to allow the challenger to take under the will if it is validated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a qualified renunciation [is] ... a necessary element in a petition for revocation. [It] protects the estate, prevents the attacker of the will from 'having his cake and eating it too,' and finally it allows the attacker to take under the will if it is validated.”
Establishes the protective purposes of the qualified renunciation requirement and why it permits beneficiaries to take under a will they challenge.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarbara Abrams, David Stein, Arthur Stein, and Violet Stark petitioned to revoke the probate of Barnet Stein's will. Each was bequeathed $1,000 under …
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PEARSON, Judge.
The question presented by this appeal is whether a disclaimer which is not qualified in language and which is made pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 732.28 at the time of a petition to revoke probate of a will may be considered qualified as to its effect in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida in Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville v. Murrey, Fla. 1950, 49 So. 2d 535, 21 A.L.R.2d 1452 and In re Purdy’s Estate, Fla.1951, 54 So. 2d 112. The circumstances out of which the issue arose is set forth by the trial judge in his order as follows:
“This cause came on to be heard on the attorney for the estate’s petition for instructions relative to the disclaimer of any interest under the Will filed by petitioners, Barbara Abrams, David Stein, Arthur Stein, and Violet Stark in their petition for revocation of probate. The disclaimer reads as follows :
‘The Petitioners disclaim any and all interest which they have under the Last Will and Testament instrument dated September 8, 1972.’ (Will being probated)
“In ARTICLE II each of the petitioners was bequeathed One Thousand Dollars. It is the position of the petitioners to revoke the Will that even though their petition has been denied to revoke the Will they would be able to take under the Will in spite of their disclaimer. This may have been possible had the petitioners entered a ‘qualified’ disclaimer but it is the interpretation of the Court that the disclaimer above quoted is positive and definite and the petitioners to revoke the Will will not be heard now to gainsay this disclaimer and claim under the Will. It is, accordingly,
“ORDERED that the petitioners, Barbara Abrams, David Stein, Arthur Stein, and Violet Stark, by their unqualified disclaimer of any interest in this Will are thereby precluded from receiving the bequests set forth in ARTICLE II of the Will.”
We believe the reasons supporting the concept of a “qualified” renunciation are set out very aptly in Estate of Wood v. Chowning, Fla.App.1972, 271 So. 2d 42, where the court said:
“ . a qualified renunciation [is] ... a necessary element in a petition for revocation. [It] protects the estate, prevents the attacker of the will from ‘having his cake and eating it too,’ and finally it allows the attacker to take under the will if it is validated. It is felt that the qualified renunciation rule works to satisfy the ultimate goal of a testative intent ...” 271 So. 2d 42, 43. Even though the law allows a qualified renunciation, it is clear that the language of the renunciation may be absolute. See Pournelle v. Baxter, 1S1 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942) ; but compare Estate of Harby, Fla.App.1972, 269 So. 2d 433.
We hold that the trial judge committed error in finding that a qualified renunciation is only one that contains certain magic words. It is clear from reading appellant’s petition to revoke probate of the will and the amendment thereto that the renunciation was put in solely for the purpose of complying with the statute and that no further purpose was intended. Therefore, the renunciation must be considered as qualified, and appellants are entitled to take under the will.
Reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order in conformity with the views set out herein.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Carman v. Gilbert, 615 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…tate. The appellant argues that the language of paragraph 6 of the petition, which facially appears to be an absolute renunciation, should be construed to be “qualified” or “conditional.” Support for this position is found in In re Estate of Stein, 301 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). In Stein, the renunciation language of the petition to revoke probate reads: 'The Petitioners disclaim any and all interest which they have under the Last Will and Testament instrument dated September 8, 1972.’ 301 So. 2d at 12…
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Carman v. Gilbert, 641 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1994)…HARDING, Justice. We have for review the opinion in Carman v. Gilbert, 615 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), which certified conflict with the opinion in In re Estate of Stein, 301 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. We quash the decision below because a renunciation of benefits which is included in a petition to revoke probate of a will should be interpr…1 / 3
Authorities Cited
- Barnett Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Murrey, 49 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1950)
- Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32 (Fla. 1942)
- In re Est. of Ethelreda W. Harby, 269 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- In re Est. of Garfield A. Wood v. Chowning, 271 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)