GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
SAMUEL R. THOMAS AND BYRON EUGENE MCDOWELL, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Grange Mutual Casualty Company appeals a judgment finding coverage under a homeowners liability policy for injuries caused by McDowell's shooting of Thomas during a family quarrel. The court affirmed, holding that an injury is covered as an 'occurrence' unless the wrongful act is intentionally directed specifically at the person injured, and rejected the insurer's argument that 'expected' injuries from willful acts should be excluded.
The court affirmed coverage, holding that unless the wrongful act is intentionally directed specifically toward the person injured, the injury constitutes an 'accident' or 'occurrence' covered by the homeowners liability policy, and rejecting the insurer's 'natural and foreseeable consequence' theory regarding 'expected' injuries.
[1] An insurance policy exclusion for bodily injury "expected or intended" by the insured does not apply to injuries that naturally and foreseeably flow from a willful act in…
[2] An injury is considered an accident or "occurrence" for which a homeowners liability policy provides coverage unless the wrongful act is intentionally directed specifical…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“unless the wrongful act complained of is intentionally directed specifically toward the person injured by such act the injury, as to that victim, is an accident or "occurrence" for which an insured tortfeasor may become legally answerable in damages as contemplated by the coverage provision of his homeowners liability policy”
Statement of the governing legal principle: coverage exists unless the act is intentionally directed at the specific victim injured
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcDowell shot Thomas, a non-participant observer of a family quarrel, during an altercation. McDowell did not intend to injure Thomas, though he inten…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Gross Negligence cases and more on FLexlaw
McNULTY, Chief Judge.
Appellee Thomas, a non-participant observer of a family quarrel between appellee McDowell and others, was shot by McDowell who, it may be said, certainly didn’t intend to injure Thomas even if it also be said he intended to shoot another. Appellant insurance company, McDowell’s homeowners liability carrier, de nied coverage under the exclusionary provision of the policy relating to bodily injury “ . . . which is either expected or intended . . . ” on the part of the insured. (Italics ours.) In a severed trial the court below ruled there was coverage and entered judgment against the appellant insurance company to the extent thereof. We affirm.
Appellant concedes that the facts herein would clearly militate against it under the settled cases which hold that such facts are not within an exclusion relating to “intentional” injury caused by the insured.1 It urges, however, that the exclusionary language in the policy before us relates also to an injury which should be “expected” by the insured, as distinguished from “intended” by him, and thus excludes those injuries which naturally and foresee-ably flow (i. e., are “expected”) from a wilful act intended albeit for a different end. We reject this contention. We see no difference in substance between the language of the exclusionary provision here and that in the policies limiting the exclusion simply to “intentional” injuries. The reasons for the judicial rejection of the “natural and foreseeable consequence” theory in the latter cases are no less valid in this one.2
Additionally, if we were to give the exclusion before us the meaning argued by appellant, then, by a parity of reasoning, we would have to exclude any injury from an unintentional tort which a given jury might categorize as being “expected” depending upon the degree of likelihood thereof under the facts and circumstances' of the case. Conceivably, indeed, this might include an injury resulting from simple negligence and,- under Florida law, could well include an injury resulting from gross negligence.3 We’re certain appellant doesn’t suggest this.
In sum, therefore, as we perceive the law to be in these cases, unless the wrongful act complained of is intentionally directed specifically toward the person injured by such act the injury, as to that victim, is an accident or “occurrence” for which an insured tortfeasor may become legally answerable in damages as contemplated by the coverage provision of his homeowners liability policy.
In view whereof, the judgment appealed from should be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur. . See, e. g., Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio (Fla.App.3d, 1971), 248 So. 2d 217, and Phoenix Insurance Company v. Helton (Fla.App.1st, 1974), 298 So. 2d 177 and cases cited therein.
. Id.
. To illustrate, an act or omission is gross negligence in Florida if a reasonably prudent man would know it would probably and most likely result in injury to another. See, e. g., Carraway v. Revell (FIa.1959), 116 So. 2d 16. Also, of. Glaab v. Caudill (Fla.App.2d, 1970), 236 So. 2d 180.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
-
Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…to disarm a person in a fight in which the insured is the aggressor, Harvey v. St. Paul Western Insurance Cos., 166 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.1964); or unintentionally shoots a bystander during a family quarrel, Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.1974); or unintentionally hits a person in a crowd of people with a car while slowly driving into the edge of the crowd intending to disperse them, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Helton, 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1974), or unintentionally i…1 / 3
-
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. & St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…to disarm a person in a fight in which the insured is the aggressor, Harvey v. St. Paul Western Insurance Cos., 166 So. 2d 822 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1964); or unintentionally shoots a bystander during a family quarrel, Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla.2d D.C.A.1974); or unintentionally hits a person in a crowd of people with a car while slowly driving into the edge of the crowd intending to disperse them, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Helton, 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla.1st D.C.A.1974), or unintentionally inj…1 / 3
-
Zordan v. Gerald "Bud" Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…und to have subjectively intended the result. See Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), aff'd, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.1985). The foregoing principle was also followed in this court’s holding in Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), that injuries which naturally and foreseeably flow from intended conduct by an insured are not for that reason “expected” and thus excluded from coverage by language in a policy similar to that in the policies in the case at hand…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Royal Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959)
- Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Cloud v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Jackson v. Rolling, 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)