WILLIAM C. LEWIS, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID LEWIS, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
BALL BUILDERS, INC., ETC., APPELLEE; DEANNA RAE DIXON LEWIS COLEMAN, ETC., APPELLANT, V. BALL BUILDERS, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
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Two consolidated appeals challenging summary judgment in wrongful death cases arising from the death of David Lewis. The court reversed, finding that a material factual dispute existed regarding whether the defendant had Workmen's Compensation insurance coverage, precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment was improperly entered because there existed a material factual question regarding insurance coverage that precluded judgment as a matter of law. The presence of a Workmen's Compensation policy does not automatically remove a case from trial court jurisdiction when coverage is disputed, and the defendant was required to answer and take a definitive position on whether it had the required coverage.
[1] A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the existence of workers' compensation insurance is correctly denied when the complaint raises a question of coverag…
[2] The existence of a workers' compensation policy does not automatically divest a court of jurisdiction if the complaint alleges a lack of coverage.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fact that there was a Workmen's Compensation policy issued does not necessarily remove this case from the trial court's jurisdiction.”
Establishes that mere existence of a WC policy does not bar jurisdiction; coverage must be actually proven.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Lewis died under circumstances giving rise to wrongful death claims. The defendant, Ball Builders, Inc., had obtained a Workmen's Compensation i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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JOHNSON, Judge.
In these two consolidated appeals, it appears from the record on appeal that the two complaints each alleged the facts relating to the death of the deceased, and, inter alia, that there was a question of whether or not the defendant had Workmen’s Compensation Insurance as provided by law and that therefore this claim did not come within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The defendant-appellee, filed motions to dismiss for the reason that the defendant had Workmen’s Compensation insurance and that under Florida Statutes Chapter 440 (Workmen’s Compensation) the court had no jurisdiction. These motions were correctly denied.
Interrogatories, request to produce (Workmen’s Compensation policy) and the depositions of the claims supervisor for Travelers Insurance Company, the Workmen’s Compensation carrier, and of the insurance producer for appellee, were filed before the Court. No answer was filed in either case, but identical motions for summary judgment were filed and upon a hearing were granted and summary final judgment entered.
In the request to produce a Workmen’s Compensation Policy was produced, in which there were certain exclusions of coverage.
In the deposition of appellee’s claims supervisor it is shown that there was no coverage in this case of the deceased.
The fact that there was a Workmen’s Compensation policy issued does not necessarily remove this case from the trial court’s jurisdiction. The question raised in the complaint is that of coverage and of damages. At the stage of the proceedings when the summary judgment was entered, there was, from the record before the court, a material fact of whether or not there was insurance coverage. The appel-lee-defendant and/or its carrier’s representative cannot assume two conflicting attitudes as to whether there was coverage or not.
We think this material question should have been raised by answer or some pleading in which the defendant would be required to take the position of whether it had the required Workmen’s Compensation coverage or not.
It was error to enter the final summary judgment without resolving this material fact.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not in conflict herewith.
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR, J., concur.