BLANTON LAKES PROPERTIES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND EDWARD CASSATLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
WWW, LTD., AND JOE A. MCCLAIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE, APPELLEES
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Appellants Blanton Lakes Properties and Cassatly sought to enforce a repurchase demand on property sold to them by McClain and WWW, Ltd., but the appellees attempted to tender payment three days late with a check containing a scrivener's error in the written amount. The court affirmed specific performance, holding that time was not of the essence and that substantial performance and equitable principles favored the appellees.
The court held that the appellees substantially performed or were ready, willing, and able to perform their repurchase obligations. Under the particular facts of the case, time was not of the essence with respect to the 170-day deadline such that a three-day delay forfeited the appellees' rights. The scrivener's error in the check was correctable, and the judgment ordering specific performance was equitably justified.
[1] A party substantially performs contractual obligations when they fulfill the essential terms, even with minor deviations, especially when the deviations are correctable s…
[2] Time is not of the essence in a contract unless expressly stated or clearly implied by the circumstances, such that a minor delay in performance does not necessarily forf…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record discloses that the appel-lees had substantially performed their requirements to repurchase or were ready, willing and able to do so.”
Establishes the court's finding of substantial performance as the basis for enforcing specific performance despite the late tender.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcClain sold properties to appellants with an agreement allowing appellants to demand repurchase under specified terms: $50,000 due in ten days and ap…
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McDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge.'
This is an appeal from a final judgment ordering specific performance in a land transaction.
Appellee McClain, individually and as Trustee, had procured certain properties in Pasco County. These properties were sold to the appellants. Along with the sale the parties agreed that the purchasers (appellants) could demand that the sellers (appel-lees) repurchase said properties. If demand was made, appellee McClain was required to pay $50,000 in ten days, pay a balance of approximately $332,000 in an additional 170 days, and assume a first mortgage. Should McClain fail to comply with the demand to repurchase, a $350,000 third mortgage he held as a result of the sale from McClain to appellants would be forfeited.
Demand was made to McClain. He paid the $50,000 on time. There was some intervening dialogue between the parties. McClain then interested and assigned his rights in the contract to appellee, WWW, LTD. Approximately three days after the 170-day period to pay the balance due had run, McClain notified the appellants of the assignment to WWW, LTD. and forwarded a check to the attorney for appellants. The check was technically deficient in that the words were for Three Hundred Thirty Two Dollars (the numerals stated $332,-000.00) and not Three Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Dollars. The appellant returned the check and declined to conclude the buy-back demand, contending primarily that performance was not timely and that valid tender was not made.
The record discloses that the appel-lees had substantially performed their requirements to repurchase or were ready, willing and able to do so. The tendered check deficiency was a scrivener’s error and would be corrected. Under the particular facts of this case time was not of the essence to the extent that a three day overage in the attempted completion forfeited the appellee’s rights. Lance v. Martinez-Arango, Fla.App., 251 So. 2d 707. In addition, the record reflects that the judgment is equitably just.
As stated in Haimovitz v. Robb, 1938, 130 Fla. 844, 178 So. 827, the test is “was the evidence sufficient to support the decree?” It was, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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SUN Bank OF Miami v. Rozanne G. Lester, 404 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…A 1968); Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 383 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The appellee relies principally upon the cases of Lance v. Martinez-Arango, 251 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), and Blanton Lake Properties, Inc. v. WWW, Ltd., 301 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). The first case is distinguishable because the buyer tendered the payment before any default was declared and, also, the seller attempted to forfeit the buyer’s deposit, whereas in the instant case the deposit was returned. In the…
Authorities Cited
- Haimovitz v. Robb, 130 Fla. 844 (Fla. 1937)
- Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 131 Fla. 70 (Fla. 1938)
- Lance v. Dr. Carlos Martinez-Arango et ux., 251 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Griffin v. State, 251 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)