SYLVIA GAIL HOWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
CLIFTON L. HOWELL, JR., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a post-divorce modification case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's reduction of alimony payments, holding that the sale of the marital home and appellant's theoretical capacity for employment did not constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to justify modification under Florida law.
The court held that there was not a sufficient showing of changed circumstances to warrant the modification. The sale of the former marital home was contemplated at the time of dissolution, and the appellant's health, education, and training were known to the appellee at the time of the original judgment and did not reflect any significant change. The appellate court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the original $700 monthly alimony payment prospectively.
[1] A modification of alimony payments requires a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the original dissolution judgment.
[2] The sale of a former marital home, contemplated at the time of dissolution, does not constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of alimony.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon a review of the record, we conclude that there was not a sufficient showing of a change in circumstances to warrant the trial court's ruling.”
The court's holding that the trial court erred in finding sufficient changed circumstances to justify modification.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marriage was dissolved by final judgment on May 11, 1972, which required the appellee to pay $700 per month in alimony and $150 per month…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Modification Of Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
BOARDMAN, Judge.
The final judgment of dissolution of the marriage of the parties to this action was entered on May 11, 1972. The final judgment provided, inter alia, that the appellee would pay the appellant $700 per month as alimony and child support in the sum of $150 per month for each of the parties’ two children. The record shows that the final judgment was drafted by the appellee, a practicing attorney, and, apparently, was to his satisfaction at that time. On April 18, 1973, the appellee petitioned for modification alleging the acquisition by the appellant of $10,000 from the sale of the former marital home and that the appellant was capable of securing permanent employment. The trial judge accepted said facts as constituting a change of circumstances justifying a reduction of the alimony payments, and, after hearing, entered the order from which this appeal followed. The order of modification, inter alia, reduced alimony to $500 per month for a period of six months, after which the award was to be further reduced to $350 per month. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that there was not a sufficient showing of a change in circumstances to warrant the trial court’s ruling. The sale of the former marital home was contemplated at the time of dissolution.
The appellant’s health, education and training, which allegedly rendered her capable of securing permanent employment, were known to the appellee and do not reflect any significant change from the time of the entry of the dissolution. We do not think that the fact that the appellant was employed for one month and earned $500, standing by itself, is sufficient reason to modify the original judgment.
Appellant also contends the awarding of $500 to her in attorney fees is unreasonable. A review of the record reveals that-this amount is consistent with the evidence before the trial judge and, therefore, will not be disturbed.
The appellee has been paying appellant the amount of money provided in the modification order and the appellant did not request a stay of the provision of the modification order pending appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that it would be equitable that the original alimony of $700 per month be reinstated prospectively upon the issuance of our mandate.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
McNULTY, J., concurs.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., dissents with opinion.
HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I think the record is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s order. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…and considered when the original judgment or agreement was entered. E. g., Withers v. Withers, 390 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Coe v. Coe, 352 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Ashbum v. Ashburn, 350 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Howell v. Howell, 301 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Waller v. Waller, 212 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 178 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). The reason for this doctrine is an obvious one: if the likelihood of a particular occurrence was one of the factors w…
-
Ludmila R. Ashburn v. Ashburn, 350 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…his was upon appellee. We think he has not carried it. From reading the provisions of the final judgment the parties were well aware, as was the trial court, that the sale of the marital home was contemplated after January 1976. In Howell v. Howell, 301 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) we held that a change of circumstances, that is receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, is not a substantial change if it had been contemplated in the final judgment. Therefore, the order appealed is modified [*…
-
Tinsley v. Lowell Andrew Tinsley, 502 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…heavier than usual burden of proof. Floyd v. Floyd, 393 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Coe v. Coe, 352 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 307 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 322 So. 2d 914 (Fla.1975); Howell v. Howell, 301 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). The husband has not carried his heavy burden in this case. Ordinarily, the purposes to which the spouse puts the alimony award generally do not support a modification of the award. Our supreme court has held that a wife’s extrava…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence