O. P. CORPORATION AND WIGGS & MAALE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., FLORIDA CORPORATIONS, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE VILLAGE OF NORTH PALM BEACH ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court denied petitioners' motion to enforce a prior mandate requiring issuance of a building permit, but permitted the trial court to consider whether respondents had good cause to revoke the permit after issuance or whether the revocation constituted an indirect violation of the mandate.
The petition to enforce the mandate was denied because the permit had been issued in compliance with the mandate. However, the trial court was granted leave to exercise jurisdiction to determine whether respondents had good cause to revoke the permit or whether the revocation was merely an indirect refusal to obey the mandate.
[1] An appellate court has jurisdiction to enforce its mandates.
[2] A lower court's compliance with an appellate court's mandate is a purely ministerial act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the judgment of an appellate court, where it issues a mandate, is a final judgment in the cause and compliance therewith by the lower court is a purely ministerial act requiring the consent of the reviewing court permitting presentation of a new matter affecting the cause”
Establishes the binding nature of appellate mandates and the ministerial duty of compliance by lower courts
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners O. P. Corporation and Wiggs & Maale Construction Co. sought a building permit from the Village of North Palm Beach. The Supreme Court prev…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners seek an order enforcing our mandate of June 22, 1973, reported at Fla., 278 So. 2d 593, wherein on rehearing granted we quashed in part and affirmed in part the District Court opinion reported at Fla. App., 266 So. 2d 676, and remanded with directions to the trial court to issue the building permit initially sought by petitioners.
Petitioners now allege respondents have revoked the permit on the basis that it was improperly issued on false statements and misrepresentations as to material facts in the original application therefor. Respondents previously sought an order in the trial court relieving them from its order requiring the permit to be issued. Petitioners thereupon sought to have respondents cited for contempt for failure to comply with the trial court order. The trial court denied respondents relief and dismissed all pleadings subsequent to its order to issue the permit as beyond its jurisdiction. In so doing the trial court acted properly in compliance with our mandate.
This Court clearly has jurisdiction to enforce its mandates pursuant to Section 25.041, Florida Statutes. See Posner v. Posner (Fla.1972), 257 So. 2d 530. It is also well settled that the judgment of an appellate court, where it issues a mandate, is a final judgment in the cause and compliance therewith by the lower court is a purely ministerial act requiring the consent of the reviewing court permitting presentation of a new matter affecting the cause. Berger v. Leposky (Fla.1958), 103 So. 2d 628, and Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp. (Fla.App.1965), 175 So. 2d 564. Petitioners’ allegations, however, admit compliance with our mandate by the District Court, the trial court, and respondents, in issuing the permit which was subsequently revoked by respondents on grounds apparently not previously before us. In view of the compliance with our mandate, petitioners are not entitled to the order sought, subject to the caveat hereinafter expressed.
Therefore, the petition to enforce our mandate is denied, but with leave to the trial court to exercise jurisdiction and to consider whether there was good cause or justification for revoking the building permit subsequent to its issuance or if the revocation is in fact merely an indirect refusal to obey the mandate.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ERVIN, McCAIN, DEKLE and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (35 total)
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Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Dep't OF Revenue of the State of Fla., 452 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1984)…is a well-settled rule of law that “the judgment of an appellate court, where it issues a mandate, is a final judgment in the cause and compliance therewith by the lower court is a purely ministerial act.” O.P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla.1974). The trial.judge, therefore, correctly enforced the mandate, even though it conflicted with ASARCO. It is the general rule in Florida that all questions of law which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of…
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Robbins v. The Honorable Frederick Pfeiffer, 407 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…ri. Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c). The judgment of an appellate court, when it issues a mandate, is a final judgment in the cause and compliance therewith by the lower court is a purely ministerial act. O. P. Corporation v. The Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1974). In the absence of a stay ordered by the appellate court, the issuance of a mandate affirming a judgment entitles the holder of that judgment to a writ of execution as a matter of right. Murphy v. Murphy, 378 So. 2d 27 (Fla.3d DCA 1980).…
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Toledo v. Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 747 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…tive issues become the law of the case and the trial court is without authority to modify, nullify, or evade that mandate. See Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla.1984); O.P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla.1974). The doctrine of law of the case applies in subsequent proceedings as long as there has been no change in the facts on which the mandate was based. See Feigen v. Sokolsky, 65 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla.1953) (en banc); Mitzenmacher v. Mitz…
Previewing 3 of 35 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sari Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972)
- Berger v. Leposky, 103 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1958)
- Gregerson v. State, 175 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- O. P. Corp. v. Lewis, 266 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- O. P. Corp. & Wiggs & Maale Constr. Co., Inc. v. The Vill. OF N. Palm Beach, 278 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1973)