JIM HOOPER DODGE, N., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,

v.

NORMAN NAIL, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• In re Est. Of Mark Daniel Zimbrick v. Zimbrick, 453 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
  …ring — that is, a motion for rehearing filed before the trial court reduced its oral pronouncement to writing. Two cases, Karl A. Kandell Associates, Inc. v. Urbanek, 391 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) and Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Seminole County, 302 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), suggest that a premature motion is a nullity which does not suspend rendition of a final order. Today we revisit and recede from these cases.1 The present appeal arises from a probate proceeding in which the divorced parents of…
• Phrances Howard v. McAULEY, 436 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
  …earing, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain appel-lee’s “petition for rehearing” since his petition was a “nullity” in that it was filed “prematurely,” i.e., before rendition of the order denying his motion. See Tri-State Systems v. Seminole County, 302 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Appellee responds that appellant’s alternative contentions miss the mark since he believes that, placing substance above form, his “petition for rehearing” should not be treated as such. [*394] Assuming that we agree with this a…
• Karl A. Kandell Assocs., Inc. v. August Urbanek, 391 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
  …earing tolled the time for filing [*783] a notice of appeal. Appellant relies upon a motion for rehearing filed after the court’s oral ruling but before entry of a written order. We dismiss the appeal. See Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Seminole County, 302 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). APPEAL DISMISSED. MOORE, BERANEK and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.…