MARGARET C. CAMMACK, APPELLANT,
v.
ARTHUR G. LEONHARDT, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ETHEL L. CRAWFORD, DECEASED, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Cammack appeals a summary judgment dismissing her breach of contract claim for an unpaid real estate brokerage commission. The court holds that genuine factual disputes exist regarding whether Cammack procured a ready, willing, and able buyer under an oral listing agreement, requiring reversal of the dismissal on that count.
A brokerage employment contract to find a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy is fulfilled when the broker produces in good faith a purchaser meeting those criteria on the specified terms, without requiring a signed contract from the purchaser. Summary judgment was inappropriate for Count I because material factual disputes existed regarding the listing agreement and whether Cammack procured a qualified buyer.
[1] A genuine issue of material fact exists when the plaintiff's deposition unequivocally details a conversation establishing a listing agreement and the defendant's depositi…
[2] A real estate broker fulfills a contract to find a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy when the broker produces such a purchaser in good faith, even if the seller s…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Count I is based upon an employment to find a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase on certain terms and conditions. Such a contract is fulfilled when the broker produces, in good faith, a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to purchase upon the terms and conditions specified in the contract of employment.”
Establishes the legal standard for broker performance under a listing contract—production of a qualified buyer, not a signed purchase agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCammack alleged she was employed by Leonhardt to procure a purchaser for real property on specified terms. She claimed to have found prospects willing…
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[*171] DOWNEY, Judge.
This case involves an appeal from a summary judgment against plaintiff-appellant in a suit to recover a real estate brokerage commission.
Appellant filed her amended complaint in five counts. Count I is based upon breach of an oral listing contract; Count II is for fraud and deceit; Count III is based upon appellant’s claim that she was the procuring cause of a sale; Count IV is based upon a conspiracy; Count V is for unjust enrichment. After the cause was at issue the court granted defendant-appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellant’s complaint with prejudice.
Our review of the record convinces us that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Counts II, III, IV, and V, and that as to those counts the summary judgment and the resulting dismissal were appropriate. However, there does-appear to be a genuine issue of material fact involved in Count I.
The amended complaint alleged in Count I that appellee Leonhardt (individually and as executor of the estate which owned the real property in question) employed appellant to procure a purchaser for the property upon certain specified terms and conditions ; that appellant procured a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase on those terms and conditions, but upon being so advised appellee Leonhardt instructed appellant to cease her attempts to sell the property and refused to pay her the commission then earned.
Leonhardt’s deposition denies the listing agreement or that appellant ever produced a contract from a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy. In her deposition appellant unequivocally details a conversation with Leonhardt in which she was given a listing on the property. She testified that her prospects agreed to the terms of the listing and that after she advised Leonhardt of this fact he directed her to proceed no further. Thus there is a dispute as to the material facts involved in Count I.
In their briefs appellees argue that the summary judgment was correct as to Count 1 because appellant never presented a contract signed by her prospects before her authority had been revoked or, as they put it, before the seller’s offer had been accepted. This position, we think, misses the point. Count I is based upon an employment to find a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase on certain terms and conditions. Such a contract is fulfilled when the broker produces, in good faith, a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to purchase upon the terms and conditions specified in the contract of employment. MacGregor v. Hosack, Fla.1952, 58 So. 2d 513; Knowles v. Henderson, 156 Fla. 31, 22 So. 2d 384, 169 A.L.R. 600 (1945); Randolph v. Neely, Fla.App.1966, 185 So. 2d 785.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate Count I of the amended complaint.
WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., concur.
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Leonhardt v. Cammack, 327 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…ove issues. Certiorari is granted and the orders of March 14 and March 27, 1975 respectively are quashed and this cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. WALDEN, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur. . See, Cammack v. Lconhardt, 302 So. 2d 170 (Fla.App. 4th, 1974).…
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Mid-Florida Realty Assocs., Inc. v. R.F. Truesdell and the Estate of Joseph O. Young, 454 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…the seller a customer who is ready, able, and willing to buy the [*749] property on the terms prescribed by the owner in the listing agreement—be it express or implied. McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 98 So. 2d 781 (Fla.1957); Cammack v. Leonhardt, 302 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). The contract to purchase must be satisfactory to the owner. If the contract departs from the owner’s terms, or adds a provision not prescribed by the owner, it is considered to be a counter-offer, which the owner may accept. Th…
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Schmalzried v. Emery M. Findley, Jr., 394 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…erms acceptable to the defendant-seller, and upon which he actually and specifically agreed. Hopkins v. Gibson Furniture, Inc., 312 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Jerry Norris, Inc. v. Ackel, 311 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Cammack v. Leonhardt, 302 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); see generally, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). Reversed.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Knowles v. Henderson, 156 Fla. 31 (Fla. 1945)
- Allie Gregory Sink v. Treadwell, 156 Fla. 31 (Fla. 1945)
- MacGregor v. Hosack, 58 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1952)
- Randolph v. Neeley, 185 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)