ARMANDO SOUTO ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
HOWARD SEGAL ET AL., APPELLEES
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In this automobile accident case, the trial court reduced one plaintiff's jury verdict by 75% despite a jury finding that the plaintiff was free from negligence, based on comparative negligence doctrine. The appellate court reversed, holding that comparative negligence does not apply to reduce a plaintiff's damages when the jury expressly finds the plaintiff was not negligent, and that a defendant found partially negligent remains liable for the full amount of damages.
Comparative negligence does not operate to reduce a plaintiff's recovery when the jury expressly finds the plaintiff free from negligence. A defendant tort feasor remains liable for the total amount of damages awarded by the jury, even if found only partially negligent, and the burden is on the defendant to seek contribution from other potential tort feasors.
[1] Comparative negligence does not reduce a plaintiff's recovery when the jury expressly finds the plaintiff free from negligence.
[2] A defendant tortfeasor is liable for the total amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff found free from negligence, even if other tortfeasors contributed to the plaintiff…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence contributing to cause her injuries, the doctrine of comparative negligence was not involved. The plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants for the damages awarded to her by the jury.”
Establishes the core holding that comparative negligence does not apply when plaintiff is found free from negligence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Armando and Isolina Souto were injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendant Lorraine Segal. The jury returned a special …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, appeal the final money judgment awarded in their favor pursuant to a jury verdict in an action for damages arising from an automobile accident.
The trial court submitted special verdict forms to the jury over plaintiffs’ objections; the jury returned its special verdict finding Lorraine Segal guilty of negligence proximately causing injuries to the plaintiffs in the amount of 25 per cent, and found the plaintiffs free from negligence. The jury awarded the plaintiff, Isolina Souto, damages in the amount of $8,000.00 and her husband, Armando Souto, the amount of $2,000.00. The court then reduced the $8,000.00 verdict to Isolina by 75 per cent, leaving Armando his full $2,000.-00.
Appellants contend that the court erred in reducing Isolina’s damages since the doctrine of comparative negligence does not operate to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery where the jury expressly finds the plaintiff free from negligence.
Appellees contend that the 75 per cent reduction was proper and that the award to Armando should have been reduced by that percentage as well because the defendant was only 25 per cent negligent.
The record reflects that a “phantom vehicle” may have been involved in the accident in such a manner as to have been a causative factor in plaintiffs’ injuries. Appellees rely on this in urging the theory that since they were found to be only 25 per cent negligent, this is the extent of their liability, and app-’lants must seek out the “phantom driver” for full recompense. Assuming arguendo the “phantom” is fact, there is no question that the doctrine of no contribution between tort feasors applies. See Issen v. Lincenberg, Fla.App. 1974, 293 So. 2d 777. Ergo, appellees (or any defendant tort feasors) are liable for the total amount of damages and it is they who have the burden to seek out the “phantom,” if they so desire. In Issen, supra, this court stated at page 778, . . where the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence contributing to cause her injuries, the doctrine of comparative negligence was not involved. The plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants for the damages awarded to her by the jury.” We follow this reasoning and not only find the trial court correct in not reducing the award to Armando, but we also reverse the amended judgment and instruct the court to reinstate the full $8,000.00 verdict for Isolina and enter judgment thereon.
We have considered appellees’ contention that the court erred in failing to submit special verdict forms or give jury instructions on the thresholds of no fault insurance, and find such contention without merit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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Est. OF Patricia Wallace v. Fisher, 567 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…le degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement”). . See Wooten v. Collins, 327 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) disapproved on other grounds, Calhoun v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 354 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1978). If Souto v. Segal, 302 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) is read to hold that it is not reversible error to refuse to give a properly requested instruction on no-fault threshold issues, then we respectfully decline to follow that case on that point and hereby certify conflict with that…
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Josef J. Dulman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 308 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…the briefs and oral arguments of counsel for the respective parties, we determine that the appellant had the right to sue any one or all of the joint tortfeasors whose negligent acts or omissions united and produced his injuries. See Souto v. Segal, 302 So. 2d 465 (Fla.App.1974); Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla.App.1974); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla.App.1963); Sands v. Wilson, 140 Fla. 18, 191 So. 21 (1939). Therefore, the trial court departed from the essential require…
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Walsh v. Neldys T. Diaz, 409 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…ption to this rule — and then only prospectively — by requiring special verdicts on the comparative negligence issue. We are neither empowered nor inclined to impose another such mandatory requirement in the present instance. Accord, Souto v. Segal, 302 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). AFFIRMED. DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur. . Concededly, the jury was otherwise properly charged on the question in accordance with the standard jury instructions and verdict forms.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)