MARSHALLYNE COVINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marshallyne Covington was convicted of premeditated murder in the shooting death of her husband, George. On appeal, she challenged the trial court's admission of her prior statements to Detective Drolet and its exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's violent character, arguing these rulings were error. The appellate court affirmed her conviction, holding that prior statements by an accused are admissible as direct evidence of guilt even when the accused claims not to remember them, and that specific isolated violent acts of the victim unknown to the defendant are properly excluded.
The trial court properly permitted Detective Drolet's testimony because prior statements by an accused in the nature of admissions and confessions are admissible as direct evidence of guilt and are not subject to the Rankin rule that prevents impeachment of a witness's claim of no recollection. The trial court also properly excluded testimony of the victim's specific violent acts because such evidence is only admissible to show the victim's general reputation for violence when known to the appellant and relevant to her defense.
[1] Evidence of prior, isolated, specific violent acts of a victim unknown to the defendant is inadmissible to prove the victim's general reputation as a violent person.
[2] A defendant's prior statement that is in the nature of an admission or confession is admissible as direct evidence of guilt, even if the defendant claims a lack of recoll…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Rankin rule would not normally apply to an accused whose prior statements in the nature of admissions and confessions are admissible as direct evidence of guilt”
Establishes that confessions and admissions by an accused are admissible as substantive evidence and are not subject to the Rankin rule preventing impeachment of claims of no recollection
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCovington was arrested on September 4, 1972, and her pistol was confiscated. While in jail, she threatened to kill her husband George and stated she w…
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McGREGOR, ROBERT B., Associate Judge.
Appellant was arrested on September 4, 1972, and her pistol was taken from her. In the city jail she was very angry and stated that she was going to kill her husband, George; she wanted her pistol back and stated she intended to get out and get another gun and kill George. George posted her bail. The next morning the appellant told her sister-in-law, “ ‘ . . . I’m going to kill your brother.’ . . . ” That afternoon she bought another pistol. That night at the Lily Rose Beer Garden the barmaid, Cleola, was talking with Willie Johnson when the appellant came in with her gun in hand and said, “ . . . T am the bitch that shot in the alley Call the goddamn police,’ ” and sat down on a bar stool. Cleola continued to talk with Willie. Appellant said, “ . . . T want a damn beer. Do you want to serve it to me or not?’ . . .” Cleola heard a click and looking down said, “ . . . ‘Yes, Ma’am’, . . .” and went to get a short Bud. Appellant turned to the juke box and was looking for a selection “Lean on Me When You Are Not Drunk,” when in walked George holding his hands open as if to place them on the bar. Appellant said “ . . . ‘Get back, m-f-\ and shot George twice. He fell without a word. Appellant got over him and said, “ . . . ‘Get up, m-f-’t . . and when Willie asked her not to shoot him anymore, appellant said, “ . . . T will kill every m-f-in here’ . . . . ” Everyone left hurriedly. Appellant was later found nearby and told the police and the gathering crowd, . . T killed him, I killed him’, . . . ‘You winos wanted him, now you can have him. I am giving him to you now on a slab.’ ” At the police station after being warned of her rights, appellant made a statement to Detective Dro-let, giving certain incriminating details.
At the trial the testimony of appellant and her witness would give the impression that appellant did not remember any incriminating details and was an emotionally distressed wife, who loved George so much she could not leave him, and that she carried her pistol with her only to prevent her children from harming themselves with it at home. The defense generally presented evidence of what a bad character George had been during his six years of marriage, apparently on the unwritten defense that George needed killing. The jury was not bound to accept any particular testimony and there is ample evidence to support their verdict of premeditated murder. When offered as evidence of the victim’s general reputation as a violent, quarrelsome and dangerous person, the trial judge properly refused to permit testimony as to prior, isolated, specific violent acts of the victim unknown to the appellant. Rafuse v. State, Fla.App.1st, 1968, 215 So. 2d 71; Williams v. State, Fla.App. 4th, 1971, 252 So. 2d 243.
The state did not call Detective Drolet until during its rebuttal case. The appellant contends that it was error to then permit him to testify because appellant had testified that she did not remember talking with him and, therefore, the rule applies that a totally negative statement—no recollection—cannot be impeached. We disagree. See Rankin v. State, Fla.1962, 143 So. 2d 193, and McCormick on Evidence 2d, 1972, § 37; 3A Wigmore, Evidence, § 1043 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Usually evidence offered for impeachment is admissible only because it relates to the credibility of the witness and is inadmissible as to the issues in controversy; hence where a witness does not remember, there is always a good possibility that the prior “inconsistent” statement is actually being offered for the wrongful purpose of getting the prior statement before the jury as substantive evidence of the facts it contains, and the Rankin rule prevents such evidence from being considered when it does not actually impeach and is otherwise inadmissible and prejudicial.
The Rankin rule would not normally apply to an accused whose prior statements in the nature of admissions and confessions are admissible as direct evidence of guilt, see Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, Fifth Edition, Volume 1, Section 235, pages 571 and 572, notes 9, 10 and 11.
The judgment below is affirmed.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
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Farrell v. State, 273 So. 3d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…he relevancy of the testimony. See Singh v. State, 36 So. 3d 848, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (no error excluding prior violent act evidence where there was no testimony that the defendant knew of the specific prior violent act); Covington v. State, 302 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (no error excluding evidence of victim’s prior violent acts that were unknown to the defendant). - 4 - The defendant need only show the “‘slightest evidence’ of an overt act by the victim ‘which may be reasonably reg…
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Nicasio Mirabal v. State, 421 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Covington v. State, 302 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); see also, Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981); Thompson v. State, 397 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hernandez v. State, 273 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1973).…
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Peterson v. State, 548 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…. We conclude that the facts of the present case satisfy the test for premeditation set forth in Tien Wang v. State, 426 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 434 So. 2d 889 (Fla.1983), and resemble the circumstances of Covington v. State, 302 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). See also Phippen v. State, 389 So. 2d 991, 993 (Fla.1980). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Rankin v. State, 143 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1962)
- Noble Williams v. State, 252 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Rafuse v. State, 215 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)