RAY SNELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ray Snell was convicted of auto theft by jury verdict. On appeal, Snell challenged the sufficiency of evidence and the admission of evidence regarding his refusal to provide his true name after Miranda warnings. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented and that the challenged evidence was material to proving Snell's knowledge of the theft.
The court held that possession of recently stolen property does not automatically prove guilt, but the jury determines the credibility of the defendant's explanation; the live and documentary testimony was sufficient for the jury to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony regarding Snell's refusal to provide his true name was admissible and material to prove scienter, as it demonstrated knowledge of the theft.
[1] A jury may convict a defendant of auto theft despite their explanation of how they came into possession of the stolen property if the evidence of guilt meets the legal st…
[2] The credibility of a defendant's explanation for possessing recently stolen property is a determination for the jury.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a party is found in the possession of goods recently stolen and gives such a reasonable and credible account of how he came into such possession as to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury he should be acquitted because of that reasonable doubt, but the jury determines the credibility of the explanation and may convict him despite his explanation if the evidence of guilt meets the standards of the law.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating a defendant's explanation when found in possession of stolen property; credibility is for the jury to determine.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRay Snell was found in possession of a stolen vehicle. When initially stopped, Snell provided a fictitious name (Warren) to the arresting officer and …
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
The appellant, Ray Snell, was found guilty of auto theft by a jury of his peers. After denial of his motion for a new trial, the appellant brought this timely appeal.
Four points are raised on appeal, only two of which merit discussion. The appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. This contention is grounded on the assumption that appellant’s testimony that he purchased the vehicle negates the presumption of theft arising from possession of the stolen property. This is not the proper statement of the applicable law. In Knight v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1968, 217 So. 2d 124, this court held:
. Where a party is found in the possession of goods recently stolen and gives such a reasonable and credible ac count of how he came into such possession as to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury he should be acquitted because of that reasonable doubt, but the jury determines the credibility of the explanation and may convict him despite his explanation if the evidence of guilt meets the standards of the law. (217 So. 2d 124, 126)
The live and documentary testimony adduced at the trial shows that there was sufficient evidence presented from which the jury could have found, beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was guilty as charged in the information.
Appellant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the prosecutor to elicit a statement from the arresting officer that the appellant, after being advised of the Miranda forewarnings, refused to disclose his name to the said officer. We point out that no objection was made by the defense to that question. Additionally, in the factual setting of this case, the question was material to the state’s case. Upon initial inquiry appellant gave the officer, prior to his arrest, a fictitious name, i. e., Warren, and, at that time, gave the officer a certificate of title (included in the state’s composite exhibit No. 1) showing title to the vehicle to be in the name of Richard Norman Warren, the owner of the vehicle. Clearly this evidence tended to prove the appellant’s knowledge that the vehicle he was apprehended in at the time of his arrest was, in fact, stolen, scienter being one of the essential elements to prove the offense of auto theft.1
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence appealed are
Affirmed.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and OVER-STREET, MURRAY W., Associate Judge, (Ret.), concur. . Section 814.03(1), Florida Statutes.
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Citator
Cited By
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Periu v. State, 490 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…ed a prima facie case of second-degree grand theft sufficient to survive a defense motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Andreasen v. State, 439 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 449 So. 2d 264 (Fla.1984); Snell v. State, 302 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1975); Burroughs v. State, 221 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see generally Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 303, 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984). For the fo…
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Snell v. State, 314 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1975)…Certiorari denied. 302 So. 2d 487. ADKINS, C. J., and BOYD, McCAIN, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Knight v. State, 217 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)