DANA BRUCE HILL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1974-10-25
No. 74-715
CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.
302 So. 2d 785 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Dana Bruce Hill was charged with breaking and entering a gasoline storage tank with intent to commit petit larceny under Florida statute § 810.05. The court reversed his conviction, holding that an underground gasoline storage tank is neither a 'vessel' nor a 'storehouse' under the statute, and therefore cannot be the subject of a breaking and entering charge.


Holding

An underground gasoline storage tank is not a vessel or storehouse within the meaning of § 810.05. The word 'vessel' in legal terminology refers to a marine structure intended for transportation, and a gasoline storage tank does not fall within this definition. Therefore, Hill cannot be convicted of breaking and entering such a tank.


Headnotes

[1] An underground gasoline storage tank is not a "vessel" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting breaking and entering a storehouse or vessel.

[2] A "storehouse" is defined as a building for keeping goods, a magazine, a repository, or a warehouse.

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Key Quotes

“It seems clear to us that a gasoline storage tank is not a vessel within the meaning of § 810.05, F.S.1973, which provides : 'Whoever breaks and enters or enters without breaking any dwelling or store house, or any building, ship, vessel, or railroad car with intent to commit a misdemeanor . . .'”

Establishes the court's core holding that storage tanks fall outside the statutory definition of 'vessel'

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Facts & Procedural History

Hill was arrested while siphoning gasoline from an underground storage tank at a service station. He removed a metal manhole-type cover that was flush…

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Opinion of the Court
DOWNEY, Judge.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellant was charged with, among other things, breaking and entering a storehouse or vessel, to wit, a gasoline storage tank, with intent to commit petit larceny in violation of § 810.05, F.S.1973. Upon denial of his motion to dismiss, appellant pleaded nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal.

Appellant was arrested when caught in the process of siphoning gasoline from an underground gasoline storage tank at a service station. At the time of the incident there were about 600 gallons of gasoline in the tank. Entrance to the tank was made by removing a metal manhole-type cover which was flush with the pavement. Beneath the cover is the top of a pipe leading vertically down through the ground into a storage tank. The cover at the top of the pipe is easily removed by hand. Appellant had inserted a long plastic hose through the manhole cover opening into the underground tank. The upper part of the hose led to appellant’s automobile gas tank which was positioned directly over the opening in the pavement.

The sole point on appeal is whether or not an underground gasoline storage tank can be the subject of a breaking and entering as being a storehouse or vessel, as contemplated by § 810.05, F.S.1973.

It seems clear to us that a gasoline storage tank is not a vessel within the meaning of § 810.05, F.S.1973, which provides : “Whoever breaks and enters or enters without breaking any dwelling or store house, or any building, ship, vessel, or railroad car with intent to commit a misdemeanor . . .” The word “vessel” is placed between the words “ship” and “railroad car,” both of which refer to vehicles of transportation. Although a vessel can mean a utensil used as a container or a tube or canal for circulating body fluid, or a craft designed to navigate on water, or an airship (see Webster’s Dictionary, 7th Edition), its use in legal terminology generally refers to a marine structure intended for transportation. See Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition. City of Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 136 Fla. 216, 186 So. 411. It is our view that the word “vessel” as used in the statute in question means a marine, structure intended for transportation. Thus, a gasoline storage tank would not be included within that definition.

In Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 851 (1898), while sustaining an attack upon an indictment for breaking and entering a storehouse, the court defined a storehouse as a building for keeping goods of any kind, especially provisions; a magazine; a repository; a warehouse. Some years later our Supreme Court in Kirkland v. State, 142 Fla. 73, 194 So. 624 (1940), held that an above the ground gasoline storage tank is not a storehouse within the contemplation of § 7220 C.G.L. (the predecessor of § 810.05, F.S.1973), and hence one may not be guilty of breaking and entering such a storage tank — the most he can be guilty of is larceny. Thus, the question involved here is no longer the subject of debate in Florida.

This is not a novel question; it has been treated elsewhere. In Moss v. Com monwealth, 271 Ky. 283, 111 S.W. 2d 628 (1938), and State v. Hoye, 174 Neb. 409, 118 N.W. 2d 325 (1962), gasoline storage tanks, one under and one above ground, were held to be storehouses within the meaning of their respective burglary statutes. Both cases are persuasive. However, true to the lesson taught in Hoffman v. Jones, Fla.1973, 280 So. 2d 431, whether we agree with the decision of the Supreme Court decided over thirty years ago in Kirkland v. State, supra, we must follow it. To quote our erstwhile brother, Judge Mann, in Johnson v. Johnson, Fla.App. 1973, 284 So. 2d 231, we receive the interpretation of the law “from our Supreme Court, agreeing with some, disagreeing with some, following all . . .

Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the charge contained in Count I of the information filed in this case.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976)
    …: “The trial court is bound by the decisions of this Court just as the District Courts of Appeal follow controlling precedents set by the Florida Supreme Court.” The principle was recognized by the Second District Court of Appeal in Hill v. State, 302 So. 2d 785 (2nd D.C.A.1974). “. . . whether we agree with the decision of the Supreme Court we must follow it. To quote our erstwhile brother, Judge Mann, in Johnson v. Johnson, Fla.App. [2nd Dist.] 1973, 284 So. 2d 231, we receive the interpretation of the l…
  • McGEE v. State, 570 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
    …the court itself that the case is no longer viable. State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla.1976); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla.1973); Ball v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 491 So. 2d 608, 610 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Hill v. State, 302 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); see also Armstrong v. State, 566 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). If we are wrong about this, the supreme court of course has the authority to review the present decision as in direct conflict with Rojas. Affirmed. . Footn…
  • State v. Erway (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)
    …legislative intent underlying it remains binding. See 2 The Whidden court construed the 1941 version of section 924.07(1), which authorized the State to appeal "[a]n order quashing an indictment or information or any count thereof." Hill v. State, 302 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (on a different matter of statutory interpretation, holding that "whether we agree with the decision of the Supreme Court decided over thirty years ago . . . we must follow it"). As in Whidden, the charging document in this…

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