E. M. PATTISON, APPELLANT,
v.
KAY REID, APPELLEE
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A real estate purchaser appealed a judgment denying specific performance of a contract for the sale of property and granting cancellation of the deposit. The court affirmed, finding that the purchaser waited too long to elect whether to accept the property despite a defect in ingress or egress.
The court affirmed the denial of specific performance, holding that the purchaser's delayed election to accept the property without the ingress or egress requirement meant the contract expired by its own terms. The purchaser's failure to timely exercise his option to either demand his deposit back or accept the property as-is precluded specific performance.
[1] A purchaser may be denied specific performance of a real estate contract if they delay too long in electing to take the property as is after discovering a remediable defe…
[2] A purchaser's delay in deciding to accept property with a known defect may constitute an expiration of their option to demand specific performance.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“at that particular point, the . . . purchaser had an option to either take the property at that point or to demand his deposit back. This wasn't done and it wasn't until several months later that he finally decided to take the property as is”
Establishes that the purchaser had a timely election to make regarding acceptance of the property, and his failure to exercise it promptly was fatal to his claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Pattison was the purchaser under a real estate contract with appellee Reid. The contract contained a requirement regarding ingress or egress…
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PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff appeals a final judgment denying specific performance of his con tract with appc,.— .or the sale and purchase of real property. Appellant was the purchaser, and in both the circuit court and this court he has maintained that the contract is clear and unambiguous. The trial judge found:
“Apparently from the actions of the parties, one side was insisting on the performance of that particular requirement and the other side apparently felt they had performed as best as they could by writing letters and getting turned down from the adjoining property owners. It seems to me that at that particular point, the . . . purchaser had an option to either take the property at that point or to demand his deposit back. This wasn’t done and it wasn’t until several months later that he finally decided to take the property as is and failed, from all the circumstances, that he waited too long to decide on that option.
“Therefore, the specific performance will be denied and affirmative relief for the cancellation of the deposit receipt as being a cloud on the title will be granted.”
Our review of the record convinces us that the trial judge reached the proper decision upon the facts before him. We therefore affirm. See Lasseter v. Dauer, Fla.App.1968, 211 So. 2d 584 and Straub v. Clark, Fla.App.1971, 244 So. 2d 763.
Because of appellant’s argument that this cause is governed entirely by the holding in Black v. Clifton, Fla.App.1973, 284 So. 2d 465, we feel that it is incumbent upon us to point out the reason that the Black holding is not applicable here. That case stands for the general proposition that a purchaser, having chosen to accept the fact that there was no ingress or egress to the property, was entitled to specific performance with an appropriate abatement in the purchase price. We do not depart from that holding because in this case the appellant purchaser did not make the election to take the land without the ingress or egress until long after the defect was determined to be unremediable. The trial court properly found that the contract had expired by its own terms.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Venema v. Tost, 424 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…red in failing to apply laches as defense in this specific performance action. DeHuy v. Osborne, 96 Fla. 435, 118 So. 161 (1928). Our view is reinforced since the contract in this case contains a “time is of the essence” provision. Pattison v. Reid, 303 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Having concluded that specific performance will not lie, we remand to the trial court the breach of contract action which was not passed upon in the first instance. The judgment, in all other respects, is.affirmed. Affirmed i…
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OUR Savior Lutheran Church v. TOM Jones Enters., Inc., 421 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…m of the option was longer than six months. See Hi Acres Groves v. Bassett, 338 So. 2d at 1076, and Brown v. Dobry, 311 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The purported exercise of the option on November 28,1978, was not only too late, Pattison v. Reid, 303 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), but was also ineffective. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to enter final judgment for appellant, voiding the purchase and sale agreement. REVERSED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. LETTS, C.J., and DELL, J., co…
Authorities Cited
- Platt A. Lasseter and Lora L. Lasseter v. Maxwell Dauer, 211 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Black v. Clifton, 284 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Straub v. Clark, 244 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)