MABLE TODD
v.
T. R. TODD
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The Florida Supreme Court reviewed an order denying temporary alimony and counsel fees in a marriage annulment case. The court held that a husband who entered into a marriage while already married could be required to pay temporary alimony, suit money, and child support, even though the marriage was void.
Yes, the husband can be required to pay temporary alimony, counsel fees, and support for the child. Equity retains jurisdiction to protect the offspring of the marriage and to place the financial burden on the party who created the situation.
“The Legislature has full power to deal with the civil status of marriage. Such power may be exercised to require the party guilty of offending the marital status to pay the cost of rectifying his wrong.”
Establishes the legislature's authority over marriage and the ability to assign costs to the offending party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff filed a bill for annulment, alleging the defendant was already married when he married her. A child was born from this union. The trial …
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This case is before us on petition for certiorari under Rule 34 of this Court.
The chancellor denied temporary alimony and counsel fees because the plaintiff’s bill was based upon ground 9 of Section 4983, C.G.L., i.e.: “That either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage sought to be annulled.”
The bill shows that defendant, while a married man, contracted a marriage with plaintiff; that there was a child by the latter marriage; plaintiff then learned for the first time of defendant’s former marriage.
The Legislature has full power to deal with the civil status of marriage. Such power may be exercised to require the party guilty of offending the marital status to pay the cost of rectifying his wrong. The Legislature has provided for temporary alimony and suit money to be granted, Section 4986, C.G.L. This statute applies to all grounds for divorce. There appears another equity in this bill, namely, support of the child. Even though the child be declared an illegitimate, the father is not relieved of the obligation to support it. Inasmuch as equity acquired jurisdiction to annul the marriage it may also retain jurisdiction to protect the offspring of the marriage. Inas*136much as the Legislature made paragraph nine a ground for divorce it expressly recognized that the ceremony possessed some requisites of a marital status. And too, we know of no constitutional restrictions to prevent the Legislature from placing the financial burden on the one who creates the unfortunate situation even though there be no marriage in law. He, who may be guilty, is in poor grace to confess his wrongdoing and say a court of equity is powerless to require him to bear the burden of restoring the former status. This question was touched upon in Worman v. Worman, 113 Fla. 233, 152 So. 435; and the same case in 118 Fla. 471, 159 So. 677.
The order we are reviewing here is in relation to temporary relief and beyond that we make no expression. It is the order that certiorari issue and the challenged order is quashed.
BROWN, C. J., WHITFIELD and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
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Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973)…(1947) ; Stehli v. Thompson, 151 Fla. 566, 10 So. 2d 123 (1942) ; Devlin v. Devlin, 157 Fla. 17, 24 So. 2d 704 (1946) ; Furman v. Furman, 130 So. 2d 316 (Fla.App.3d 1961) ; Choucherie v. Choucherie, 120 So. 2d 821 (Fla.App.3d 1960). . Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279 (1942) ; Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1953). . Hancock v. Hancock, 55 Fla. 680, 45 So. 1020 (1908) ; Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927) ; and Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla.1970). . Job 1:21. . Ca…
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Lisolette Burger v. Burger, 166 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1964)…is decision. We must determine at the outset whether this Court has jurisdiction. The [*435] petitioner claims that the decision of the District Court collides with prior decisions of this Court in Young v. Young, Fla., 97 So. 2d 470; Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279, and Therry v. Therry, 117 Fla. 453, 158 So. 120. By its decision in the instant case the District Court held that the finding of a valid marriage is an essential prerequisite to the granting of a decree of divorce under Florida law. I…1 / 2
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Young v. Young, 97 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1957)…ior living spouse as ground for á divorce decree and that in any such divorce proceeding the court shall make such orders with reference to allowances for the wife as fit the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case. In Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279, a woman brought a complaint against her putative husband on the ground that he was married to a prior living spouse. The Chancellor denied temporary alimony and counsel fees. On certiorari the order of denial was quashed on the ground…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Worman v. Worman, 113 Fla. 233 (Fla. 1933)
- Worman v. Worman, 118 Fla. 471 (Fla. 1935)