GENERAL PROPERTIES COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION,
v.
RELLIM INVESTMENT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL.
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General Properties Company sought to enjoin the City of Coral Gables from taxing its property and to cancel tax certificates, claiming the property was too remote and unsuitable for municipal development. The Florida Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was estopped by lapse of time and failed to establish equity for discovery, reversing the lower court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff was estopped in equity from claiming relief due to unexplained delay of more than fifteen years, and there was no equity for discovery of the certificate consideration where the plaintiff made no offer to redeem and did not affirmatively disclose the full character of the certificates.
“by plaintiff's unexplained delay for more than fifteen years to seek relief, he is estopped in equity from now claiming relief to nullify the certificates”
Establishes the court's holding that equitable estoppel bars the plaintiff's claim based on unreasonable lapse of time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceProperty was incorporated into the City of Coral Gables by legislative act in 1925. The city issued general bonds in 1926 but suffered financial rever…
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This case is before us on petition for certiorari under Rule 34 of this Court to review an order denying a motion to dismiss a bill in equity. The bill seeks to enjoin the defendant, City of Coral Gables, from taxing plaintiffs property because of remoteness and lack of benefits. The bill also for the same reason *138seeks to cancel city tax certificates now owned by the defendant, General Properties Company. The bill seeks also discovery as to the amount paid for the certificates. There is no offer in the bill to redeem the certificates.
The property here involved was incorporated by legislative act in 1925 into the City of Coral Gables. Chapter 10418, Special Laws of 1925. In 1926, the municipal corporation issued its general bonds totaling over four and one half million dollars for general municipal purposes. For a time, the municipality thrived and prospered; with the collapse of the boom it sustained severe reverses. Such was the plight of the City until the filing of this amended bill in December of 1941. It is alleged that plaintiff’s property was rural and not necessary or suitable for the development of the City in 1925 and. at all times subsequent thereto. It is alleged that the City is unlawfully usurping the functions of government over the area in question and has issued tax certificates thereon (the date is not stated) and that same are now held by defendant and petitioner here, General Properties Company.
The first question is whether there was equity in the bill to cancel the certificates. This Court has approved this method of procedure for relief provided the plaintiff is not estopped. City of Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837. As to whether plaintiff is estopped by the lapse of time we may consider whether the statute of limitations on actions at law are applicable and if so, whether sufficient time has run to constitute a defense because equity will ordinarily follow the law. If therefore,' plaintiff had prosecuted an action at law, he might have been *139barred by the four year statute of limitations. Section 4663, Compiled General Laws of 1927. Quo warranto proceedings are prosecuted by the State and the statute of limitations will not ordinarily run against the State; yet where the action is to enforce a purely personal right, the statute will apply. People v. Boyd, 132 Ill. 60, 23 N.E. 342 (affirming 30 Ill. App. 60) People v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Pac. 934, 93 Cal. App. 532. Furthermore it appears to us that by plaintiff’s unexplained delay for more than fifteen years to seek relief, he is estopped in equity from now claiming relief to nullify the certificates. It is true the certificates do not appear to be over four or even' fifteen years, old. However, we may indulge that assumption by construing the pleading against the pleader.
The next question is whether there was equity in the bill for discovery of the consideration paid for the certificates the evident purpose being to determine whether plaintiff would desire to redeem same if they should be held valid tax liens. So far as this bill shows this information might be obtained , without resorting to discovery in equity. The bill does not affirmatively disclose the full character of the certificates. It is true this Court held in Lang, et ux., v. Quaker Realty Co., 131 Fla. 179, 179 So. 144, that plaintiff, in foreclosing city tax certificates, was limited to the amount paid for same plus interest.(Such interest does not mean penalties fixed by statute but implied rate of eight per cent per annum. Hyland v. Rodney on petition for clarification 142 Fla. 319, 195 So. 574.) This Court has recently held, consistent with the Quaker Realty case, that if the amount to redeem is fixed by contract or statute, *140equity will not deviate therefrom. Boston and Florida Atlantic Coast Land Co. v. Alford, 150 Fla. 296, 8 So. (2nd) 483.
With the limited allegations in the bill with reference to the character of the certificates, we are unable to pass upon the right to redeem at less than the face of same with interest and penalties.
It was error to deny the motion to dismiss., The plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to amend if it desires.
The writ is granted and the challenged order is quashed.
BROWN, C. J., WHITFIELD and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
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Heidt v. Caldwell, 41 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1949)…of Florida from recovering a judgment for the value of maintaining the incompetent from 1923 until 1936. The language of this Section is not made applicable to the State of Florida. The cited case of General Properties Co. v. Rellim Investment Co., 151 Fla. 136, 9 So. 2d 295, has not been overlooked. It is admitted that the State of Florida presented its claim to the administrator and demanded payment within the eight months period. Counsel for appellant contend (1) that the evidence is legally insufficie…
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In re Est. of Lincoln R. Smith v. Smith, 132 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…of Florida from recovering a judgment for the value of maintaining the incompetent from 1923 until 1936. The language of this Section is not made applicable to the State of Florida. The cited case of General Properties Co. v. Rellim Investment Co., 151 Fla. 136, 9 So. 2d 295, has not been [*429] overlooked. It is admitted that the State of Florida presented its claim to the administrator and demanded payment within the eight months period.” In the annotation in 34 A.L.R.2d 1003, 1010, the following observ…
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Smith v. City OF Winter Haven, 154 Fla. 439 (Fla. 1944)…complaint was properly dismissed because it did not allege present unsuitability for as well as that the lands in question were not potentially necessary for lawful municipal benefits. General [*442] Properties Company v. Rellim Investment Company, 151 Fla. 136, 9 So. (2nd) 295, is relied on to support this contention. The ■ facts in the latter case are so materially different from those in the case at bar that it is not in point. In our view, this point is concluid by State ex rel. Harrington v. City of…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The City of Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724 (Fla. 1937)
- Lang v. Quaker Realty Corp., 131 Fla. 179 (Fla. 1938)
- Casol Justice v. State, 130 Fla. 777 (Fla. 1937)
- Hyland v. Rodney, 142 Fla. 319 (Fla. 1939)
- Boston & Fla. Atl. Coast Land Co. v. Ricker Alford & Madison Realty Co., 150 Fla. 296 (Fla. 1942)