SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
PAUL J. ARNETT, JR., RESPONDENT
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Seaboard Coast Line Railroad sought review of a circuit court order striking its fourth affirmative defense of estoppel by judgment. The court denied the petition, holding that an earlier jury verdict in a suit brought for one child's death did not bar a subsequent suit for the other child's death from the same collision, as each involved a separate cause of action.
The court held that the defense of estoppel by judgment was inapplicable because the two suits involved different causes of action—one for each child's death—even though they arose from the same collision. Each child's death constituted a separate claim, so the prior verdict in one case did not preclude the later suit for the other child's death.
[1] Collateral estoppel by judgment does not apply when the prior litigation involved the death of a different individual, even if the underlying facts and legal issues are s…
[2] A prior "not guilty" verdict in a lawsuit arising from a collision does not estop a plaintiff from litigating liability for the death of a different victim in the same co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the causes of action involved two different persons. No matter how similar the points of law and questions may be, the points and questions herein revolve around the death of Paul Joe Arnett, the minor child of the plaintiff, and not of Carol Arnett, [*654] who was the other minor child lost in said collision.”
Establishes the core reasoning that each child's death creates a separate and distinct cause of action despite arising from the same collision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA train-auto collision resulted in the death of two minor children, Carol Arnett and Paul Joe Arnett. The plaintiff sued the railroad for the death of…
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JOHNSON, Judge.
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, seeking review of an order of the Circuit Court striking the fourth defense asserted by the petitioner herein in its answer in the trial court.
There is some question (which we do not find it necessary for us to answer as determinative of this case) as to whether or not the extraordinary remedy of common law certiorari may be utilized by litigants as a vehicle for interlocutory review in common law actions (see Hotel Roosevelt Company, Inc. v. Hill, 196 So. 2d 233 (Fla.App.1st, 1967).
The fourth defense contained in the petitioner’s amended answer alleged substantially that the plaintiff had litigated the question of liability of the defendant railroad in a previous suit by the same plaintiff against the same railroad arising out of the same collision in which both of the plaintiff’s two children were killed, in which the jury had rendered a verdict of “not guilty” as to the railroad.
There is no question about the facts that the death of the two children was the result of the auto-train collision in question. However, as held by the Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Culloden v. Music, 226 So. 2d 240 (1969), the causes of action involved two different persons. No matter how similar the points of law and questions may be, the points and questions herein revolve around the death of Paul Joe Arnett, the minor child of the plaintiff, and not of Carol Arnett, who was the other minor child lost in said collision.
Therefore, we agree with the holding of our sister Court, in Culloden v. Music, supra, that said defense of estoppel by judgment is not applicable to the facts in this case and that the trial court was not in error in striking the same.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari denied.
SPECTOR, Acting C. J., concurs.
BOYER, J., specially concurring.
BOYER, Judge
(concurring specially).
I am in complete agreement with the above opinion however, I think it pertinent to note that our holding may also soundly rest upon the further basis that the previous suit was tried under the doctrine of contributory negligence, then a complete defense; whereas the case Sub judice would be tried under the doctrine of comparative negligence. (See Hoffman v. Jones, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1973, 280 So. 2d 431)
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Citator
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Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. COX, 338 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1976)…r certiorari to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 308 So. 2d 154 (Fla.App.2d 1975). There is conflict with the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Arnett reported at 303 So. 2d 653 (Fla.App. 1st 1974). We have jurisdiction to harmonize these decisions.1 The legal issue to be decided concerns the applicability of estoppel by judgment. The circumstances of this case are as follows. In May of 1972 the parents of the respondent,…
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Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. COX, 308 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…t held that the defendant was not estopped from relitigating the issues as they pertained to Roger’s death. The First District Court of Appeal followed Culloden in its recent case of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Arnett, Fla.App.1st, 1974, 303 So. 2d 653. [*156] This would seem to set the matter at rest were it not for the case of Shearn v. Orlando Funeral Home, Fla. 1956, 88 So. 2d 591. There, a widow recovered a judgment in a combined survival and wrongful death action arising out of the death of…
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Inez Wilson v. ST. Louis & SAN Francisco R.R. Co., 309 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…ason of the newly discovered comparative negligence doctrine in Hoffman v. Jones, supra, which was rendered after the trial of the administratrix’s action. We agree and reverse. (See Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Arnett, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 303 So. 2d 653, and Fitzsimmons v. City of Pensacola, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 297 So. 2d 107.) Valdez v. Fesler, Fla.App. 2nd 1974, 298 So. 2d 512, is not applicable for the reason that there it is apparent that the appellant (plaintiff in the trial court) consciously…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)
- Culloden v. Amos Music, 226 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Hotel Roosevelt Co., Inc. v. Hill, 196 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)