MARGARET W. INGRAM, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT LESLIE PETTIT, JR., AND THE LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AN INSURANCE CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1974-12-03
No. V-426
RAWLS, C. J., and McCORD and BOYER, JJ., concur.
303 So. 2d 703 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

In a negligence case arising from a rear-end collision, the court held that voluntary intoxication alone, without more, cannot elevate simple negligence to gross negligence warranting punitive damages. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on punitive damages despite the defendant's intoxication at the time of the accident.


Holding

No. Voluntary intoxication, standing alone, does not elevate simple negligence to gross negligence or culpable negligence sufficient to support punitive damages. The negligent act itself must be wanton, reckless, and evince gross disregard for safety; intoxication does not transform an otherwise simple negligent act into one meeting this threshold.


Headnotes

[1] Voluntary intoxication of a motorist, even to a degree creating a legal presumption of intoxication, does not, in itself, transform simple negligence into gross negligenc…

[2] To recover punitive damages in an accident case, a plaintiff must prove culpable negligence, defined as a gross and flagrant character evincing reckless disregard of huma…

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Key Quotes

“The long and well-established principle of law in this jurisdiction is that to recover punitive damages incident to an accident case a plaintiff must prove culpable negligence”

Establishes the legal standard requiring culpable negligence as a prerequisite to punitive damages in accident cases.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant's stopped vehicle was struck from behind by appellee's automobile traveling 30-35 mph. The investigating officer believed appellee was intox…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant poses the sole point on appeal as: Can voluntary intoxication of a motorist to any degree be the basis of a jury question as to “gross negligence” and consequent punitive damages ?

This cause arose out of a rear end collision between an automobile operated by appellant which was stopped for traffic, and an automobile driven by appellee at an estimated speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour. The investigating officer was of the opinion that appellee was intoxicated.1 The trial court directed a verdict of liability as to appellee’s negligence and for the appel-lee on the issue of punitive damages. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the amount of damages, so a mistrial was declared. Subsequently, the trial judge granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages ; hence this appeal.

The undisputed facts disclose that the negligent acts on the part of appellee fall within the purview of simple negligence. Stated in another way, absent any proof of intoxication on the part of appellee, unquestionably, punitive damages would not have been sought. Thus the real issue is whether intoxication, coupled with a negligent act, opens the appellee’s pockets for punitive damages in the name of gross negligence. Appellant, by her brief, reasons :

“The criminal case law of Florida is almost unbelievably complacent towards the most uncalled for and unnecessary danger on our public highways — the drunk driver. . . . Rather, we feel that there is no place on our highways for the drunken driver and if the threat of criminal prosecution won’t keep him off, maybe the threat of his pocketbook will.”

The long and well-established principle of law in this jurisdiction is that to recover punitive damages incident to an accident case a plaintiff must prove culpable negligence, which we defined in Peel v. State, 291 So. 2d 226 (1 Fla.App. 1974), as :

“The ‘culpable negligence’ required to sustain a manslaughter charge must be of ‘a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects; or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of indifference to consequences; or such wantonness or recklessness or grossly careless disregard of safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.’ Savage v. State, 152 Fla. 367, 11 So. 2d 778, 779.”

The negligent act on the part of appellee did not fall within the definition of gross negligence or culpable negligence. The fact that appellee had partaken of alcoholic beverages immediately prior to the accident does not make an act wanton and reckless that was not otherwise so. Smith v. State, 65 So. 2d 303 (Fla.1953).

The judgment appealed is affirmed.

RAWLS, C. J., and McCORD and BOYER, JJ., concur. . Appellee submitted to a breathalizer test and was found to have a blood alcohol content of .26 — a legal presumption of intoxication arises on a .10 scale.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976)
    …he decision of the district court is quashed and the trial court is directed to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury- OVERTON, C. J„ ana ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, J., dissents with an opinion. . Ingram v. Pettit, 303 So. 2d 703 (1st DCA Fla. 1974). . Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b)(3). The district court’s decision is in direct conflict with Busser v. Sabatasso, 143 So. 2d 532 (3d DCA Fla. 1962). . Section 322.262(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1973). This presumption applies “upon the tri…
  • Walker v. The City OF Miami, 337 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …pretrial conference. Plaintiff did not develop any theory of the evidence through discovery or during trial that would bring this case within the rule requiring wantonness or reckless indifference and disregard. See Ingraham v. Pettit, Fla.App.1974, 303 So. 2d 703; Tuel v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 597. As to the conduct of the trial, the appellant urges error in the court’s exclusion of photographs of the deceased child taken at the morgue. He argues that the photographs were relevant to t…
  • AETNA Cas. Co. & Dorothy Innes Higgs v. Barrett, 315 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
    …tomobile at the time of the subject accident. Therefore, the trial court erred in declining to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of Appellant-Higgs and against Appellee-Glenn Barrett on the issue of punitive damages. See Ingram v. Pettit, 303 So. 2d 703 (Fla.App.1974). Accordingly, the final judgment entered by the trial court is modified by striking the award to Appellee-Barrett of punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed. Affirmed as modifi…

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