GEORGE M. POWELL
v.
AUSTIN T. RACE AND HIS WIFE, ANNA B. RACE
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A creditor sued to set aside conveyances of property from a husband to his wife, arguing they were fraudulent. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that once a creditor proves the transfer, the burden shifts to the wife to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a resulting trust existed based on the wife's original contribution of funds.
Once a creditor-plaintiff introduces evidence of a judgment and record of transfers, the burden shifts to the wife asserting a resulting trust to prove the trust's existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence. The wife failed to meet this burden because she did not testify and relied only on her husband's testimony, which would have been insufficient under the proper legal standard.
“the party asserting a resulting trust must prove same by removing every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear strong and unequivocal evidence”
Establishes the high standard of proof required when a spouse asserts a resulting trust to defend against a creditor's action
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant husband conveyed property to his wife for nominal consideration. The wife's answer admitted the conveyances but claimed the property was ori…
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Suit was filed by plaintiff, a creditor, to set aside certain conveyances passing title from the defendant husband to the defendant wife. From a decree dismissing the bill this appeal is taken. The decree is predicated on the chancellor’s finding that the plaintiff had not proved that the conveyances were fraudulently made. It appears that the chancellor misconceived the applicable law and thereby reached an erroneous conclusion.
*537The wife’s answer was in the nature of a confession and avoidance. It admitted the title was in the husband and the conveyances were made for a nominal consideration to place the title in the wife. The answer sets up as a defense that the property was purchased by the husband originally with the wife’s money; that the property in equity belonged to the wife all the while. This, in fact, was an affirmative declaration of a resulting trust. The burden of proving same necessarily rested with the wife. It is argued that in cases where the property is purchased with the wife’s funds and the title is taken in the husband’s name, the presumption of fraud does not arise by virtue of a subsequent conveyance to the wife even where the husband is insolvent. Cited for this is Florida Chancery Pleading and Practice, Kooman, page 568. The author cites for such authority Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277, 179 So. 882. Upon rehearing granted this Court held in Foster v. Thornton that when plaintiff introduced his judgment and the record of the transfers the burden then shifted to the wife to prove by clear and strict proof the essential elements of her defense. This principle was reaffirmed by us in Thomas v. Burke, 146 Fla. 5, 200 So. 69.
When the issue is thus framed the nature of the case is transformed from one of fraud to that of trust. The wife asserting the trust, is burdened with the proof just as in all such cases. This Court has many times said that the party asserting a resulting trust must prove same by removing every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear strong and unequivocal evidence. McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479, 71 So. 836; Semple v. Semple, 90 Fla. 7, 105 So. 134; Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647, 54 So. 892; Foster v. Thorn*538ton, supra; Lofton v. Starrett, 23 Fla. 565, 2 So. 837; Geter v. Simmons, 57 Fla. 423, 49 So. 131; Brown v. Brown, 106 Fla. 423, 143 So. 737.
In the case at bar the wife did not testify. She relied entirely on the testimony of her husband. This testimony as we find it here would not have been sufficient had the casé been tried upon the theory that the burden of proof rested with the wife, hence the error was not harmless. It is our opinion that the decree should be reversed for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Decree reversed.
BROWN, C. J., WHITFIELD, and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bethea v. Langford, 45 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1949)…to establish the trust "must be so clear, strong and unequivocal as to remove from the mind of the Chancellor every reasonable doubt as to the existence of the trust." Goldman v. Olsen, 159 Fla. 435, 31 So. 2d 623, 624; Powell v. Race, 151 Fla. 536, 10 So. 2d 142; Frank v. Eeles,152 Fla. 869, 13 So. 2d 216; Brown v. Brown, 106 Fla. 423,143 So. 737; Burgess v. Wirt, 91 Fla. 425, 108 So. 169; Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647, 54 So. 892; Geter v. Simmons, 57 Fla. 423, 49 So. 131; Lofton v. Sterrett, 23 Fla.…
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State v. Graham, 240 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…tariness and defined prima facie to mean “the quality and quantum of evidence from which an inference of vol-untariness can reasonably be drawn.” . 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2497 p. 325 (3d ed. 1940). . Id. at § 2498 p. 329. . Powell v. Race, 1942, 151 Fla. 536, 10 So. 2d 142 (burden of proof on party asserting a resulting trust is to remove “every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence.” This is certainly a hybrid of Wigmore’s “clear and convincing,” but we do not…
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Goldman v. Olsen, 159 Fla. 435 (Fla. 1947)…. 837; Geter v. Simmons, 57 Fla. 423, 49 So. 131; Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647, 54 So. 892; Burgess v. Wirt, 91 Fla. 425, 108 So. 169; Brown v. Brown, 106 Fla. 423, 143 So. 737, Frank v. Eeles 152 Fla. 869, 13 So. (2nd) 216 and Powell v. Race 151 Fla. 536, 10 So. (2nd) 142 and cases there cited. There is no rule of evidence more strongly imbedded in our jurisprudence. Plaintiff, to prove her case, offered testimony tending to or proving a joint venture between her and Goldman with respect to the acq…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rosa Chappelle McGill and her husband S. D. McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479 (Fla. 1916)
- Wyatt J. Geter v. Simmons, 57 Fla. 423 (Fla. 1909)
- Semple v. Semple, 90 Fla. 7 (Fla. 1925)
- Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277 (Fla. 1937)
- Lofton v. Sterrett, 23 Fla. 565 (Fla. 1887)
- Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647 (Fla. 1911)
- Brown v. Brown, 106 Fla. 423 (Fla. 1932)
- Thomas v. Burke, 146 Fla. 5 (Fla. 1941)