STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LARRY PRICKETT AND STEPHANIE PRICKETT, APPELLEES
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Florida appealed a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained during a search warrant execution at a private residence. The court affirmed the suppression, holding that police violated Florida's knock-and-announce statute by failing to identify themselves as officers before entering the home.
The trial court correctly suppressed the evidence because police violated Florida Statute § 933.09 by failing to announce their authority and purpose prior to entering the house to execute the search warrant. The state presented no evidence justifying the police actions under any statutory exception. The defendants had standing to attack the warrant execution based on their possessory interest in the premises.
[1] A defendant has standing to challenge the execution of a search warrant if they have a sufficient possessory interest in the premises searched.
[2] A defendant charged with possession of illegal drugs has standing to challenge a search warrant executed at the premises where the drugs were found.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The police officers failed to announce either their authority or their purpose prior to entering the house to execute the search warrant as required by Fla.Stat. § 933.09.”
Establishes the core violation—failure to comply with the knock-and-announce statute that was dispositive to the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Miami. Two undercover officers knocked on the door, and when Stephen Endy answered, he kne…
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HENDRY, Judge.
This appeal by the state attacks a ruling by the trial court granting the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence.
The evidence was obtained when police executed a search warrant at a private dwelling located at 9401 S.W. 15th Street, in Miami. Subsequent thereto, the defendants were informed against, charged with illegal possession of amphetamine salt and cannabis.
The record on appeal reveals that two officers, acting undercover, went to the residence in question to execute the warrant. A witness at the hearing on the motion to suppress, one Stephen Endy, testified that he responded to a knock on the front door. Endy stated that he knew one of the two men, but not as a police officer. He testified further that the officers did not announce they were police officers or that their purpose was to execute a search warrant.
Endy invited the two men into the house, and shortly thereafter they informed him that they were police officers. At almost the same moment, other police officers entered through the front door, which was closed, to assist in the search.
At the outset, we address certain procedural questions raised by the state. We find slight merit to these contentions.
The state argues that the court was required to deny the motion to suppress because the defendants offered no evidence that a search warrant existed or was executed. Secondly, the state contends that the defendants lacked standing to attack the execution of the search warrant.
A cursory examination of the record of this case establishes that the very purpose of the hearing held in the trial court concerned the execution of the search warrant. In addition, the trial judge was well aware of the warrant which was before him at the hearing.
The state relies on RCrP 3.190(h)(2) and (3), and more particularly on the language contained therein that “the defendant shall present evidence supporting his position.”
We think the state attempts to put a strained and illogical interpretation upon the rule. The rule doesn’t require the defendant to prove the obvious, or in this instance, the very purpose for holding a hearing.
Nor, do we think the defendants lack standing. They had a sufficient possessory interest in the premises to attack the warrant. Moreover, in charging the defendants in the information with possession of illegal drugs, the state adopts an inconsistent position by arguing that the defendants now do not have standing. See, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).
Turning now to the merits of this controversy, we think it is plain that the trial judge correctly granted the motion to suppress.
The police officers failed to announce either their authority or their purpose prior to entering the house to execute the search warrant as required by Fla.Stat. § 933.09. See, State v. Kelly, Fla.1973, 287 So. 2d 13; Earman v. State, Fla.1972, 265 So. 2d 695; Moreno v. State, Fla.App.1973, 277 So. 2d 81; State v. Collier, Fla.App.1972, 270 So. 2d 451.
In addition, the record is devoid of any evidence offered by the state to justify the police actions in this case under one of the exceptions to the statute.
Therefore, it is our conclusion that the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence seized, and his ruling accordingly is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Ernie W. Norman v. State, 388 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…standing rule is no more. Thirty-four Florida cases have considered the Jones decision. With the exception of three cases, State v. Dycus, 238 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Curry v. State, 355 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); and Prickett v. State, 305 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), the reliance on Jones concerned other aspects of that decision, e. g., the “legitimately-on-the-premises” concept of standing.5 In State v. Dycus, supra, the court acknowledged that Jones established the rule that when the prose…
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State v. Clarke, 387 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…the rule pertains to forcible entry. If the officers do not “break and enter”, even technically, the rule does not apply, and it is pointless to speculate whether the circumstances give rise to an exception to the rule. Likewise, State v. Prickett, 305 So. 2d 222 (Fla.3d DCA 1974) might seem to support appellees’ contention, but again careful examination discloses that although the facts recited there showed an invited entry, the court never once mentions the impact of that circumstance on the applicability…
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State v. Busbee, 344 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…uncing their authority and purpose under circumstances which do not excuse such announcement, the trial court was eminently correct in suppressing the evidence seized in the dwelling. Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1964); State v. Prickett, 305 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); McLendon v. State, 176 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1960)
- Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. Kelly, 287 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)