MARK WEBBER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Webber was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and sentenced to 15 years, but the appellate court reversed for a new trial due to two evidentiary errors: admission of evidence of an unrelated similar crime and admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights after the defendant clearly invoked his right to silence.
The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that both evidentiary errors were plainly harmful and warranted reversal despite the evidence being barely sufficient to sustain the conviction. The admission of unrelated evidence of the Brandon crime was improper because it had no connection to the Plant City conspiracy and was plainly irrelevant to the charges against Webber. The statements obtained after Webber invoked his Miranda right to silence were plainly improper and erroneous to admit.
[1] Evidence of a separate crime is inadmissible if it is irrelevant to the charges against the defendant.
[2] A defendant's statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible if obtained after the defendant invokes the right to remain silent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge permitted the introduction of extensive testimony, including that of the victims involved, of another similar crime committed by Gill, Fleming, and Anglin in Brandon, Florida, on the next day, September 15. The matter was never "connected up" to the defendant. In fact, it clearly and undisputedly appeared that Webber had nothing whatever to do with it.”
Establishes the irrelevance and impropriety of admitting evidence of an unrelated crime with no connection to the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWebber was charged with conspiracy to kidnap the son of a supermarket owner in Plant City on September 14, 1973, a crime actually carried out by three…
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SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge.
Webber appeals from a judgment of guilt and a 15-year sentence, which followed a jury verdict against him, for conspiracy to commit the felony of kidnapping. Although we are convinced that the evidence is — albeit only barely so — sufficient to sustain the verdict, we reverse for a new trial because of two plainly harmful evidentiary errors committed below.
Webber was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to effect the kidnapping for ransom of the son of the owner of Felton’s supermarket in Plant City on September 14, 1973, a crime which was actually perpetrated on that date by three other men, Gill, Fleming and Anglin. On the representation by the prosecutor that the matter would be “connected up,” the trial judge permitted the introduction of extensive testimony, including that of the victims involved, of another similar crime committed by Gill, Fleming, and Anglin in Brandon, Florida, on the next day, September 15. The matter was never “connected up” to the defendant. In fact, it clearly and undisputedly appeared that Webber had nothing whatever to do with it. The Brandon kidnapping-extortion was conceived, planned and executed solely by the three active participants in the Plant City crime, only after the crime in the instant case had taken place (and had failed to reap the expected financial rewards.) It had not been discussed with Webber and was plainly not a part of the Plant City conspiracy in which he arguably was involved and of which he was alone charged. The Brandon crime was thus simply irrelevant to the charges against the defendant. The trial court therefore erred in permitting, and in failing to strike, the evidence before the jury which related to it.
In addition, an F. B. I. agent, Krout, was permitted to testify concerning statements made to him by the defendant while in his custody for an alleged Hobbs Act violation. Upon Krout’s giving him the Miranda warnings, Webber specifically declined to waive his rights and elected to remain silent. The record clearly demonstrates that Krout nevertheless continued to question him and even indicated that it would go easier with Webber if he cooperated ; and that statements received into evidence followed these questions and that promise. It was plainly improper for the questioning to proceed after Webber’s statement that it was not desired, and plainly erroneous to admit the statements which were the result of that interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
Reversed and remanded.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
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Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…, Florida cases have recognized that relatively little pressure by the police may overcome a suspect’s will to remain silent. Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Webber v. State, 305 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Jones demonstrates that courts carefully scrutinize the actions of interrogating officers where a defendant has asserted his right to remain silent. There, the defendant was arrested and given Miranda warnings. At trial the arre…
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Warren v. State, 384 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to end the conversation with the officer once it had begun. Compare, e. g., Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Webber v. State, 305 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); State v. Prosser, 235 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), cert. dismissed, 243 So. 2d 419 (Fla.1971). And we concur with the statement in United States v. Jones, 486 F. 2d 599, 600 (5th Cir. 1973) that “[djenials of a crime by o…
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)