CENTRAL FLORIDA TILE COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
SPERRY RAND CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Central Florida Tile Company appealed the dismissal of its complaint alleging breach of an oral lease agreement with Sperry Rand Corporation. The lower court dismissed based on the statute of frauds, but the appellate court reversed, finding the complaint stated a cause of action because factual allegations regarding written memoranda and part performance raised questions that must be resolved at trial rather than on a motion to dismiss.
The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action and should not have been dismissed. Even assuming the statute of frauds applied, the factual allegations raised questions about whether written memoranda complied with the statute, whether an implied contract existed, and whether part performance occurred—all matters requiring factual resolution rather than legal dismissal.
[1] A complaint alleging breach of an oral lease agreement states a cause of action when it includes allegations of written memoranda embodying the terms of the agreement, ac…
[2] When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true.”
Establishes the standard of review for motions to dismiss—all factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of evaluating whether the complaint states a cause of action.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant alleged that appellee signed and delivered written memoranda embodying terms of an oral lease agreement. Appellant further alleged it execut…
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JOHNSON, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment dismissing with prejudice its complaint which sought damages for a breach of an oral lease agreement. The basis for the appellee's motion to dismiss was that the alleged agreement was an executory contract for more than one year and was within the terms of the statute of frauds, and therefore the agreement was unenforceable.
We have heard oral argument in this cause and have carefully examined the record on appeal and the briefs submitted by the parties. It is our conclusion that the complaint filed below by appellant clearly states a cause of action. When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. Here, there are allegations in the complaint that appellee signed and delivered to appellant written memoranda embodying the terms and conditions of the oral agreement to lease; that appellant, at appellee’s request, executed, sealed and redelivered to appellee a formal lease agreement; that appellant, in reliance on said agreement, took certain actions pursuant to the agreement ; and that appellant made changes and improvements in fulfillment of its obligation to lease to appellee. Thus, even assuming the statute of frauds were applicable to the oral agreement, the allegations of appellant’s complaint raise sufficient factual questions as to state a cause of action and withstand a motion to dismiss. For example, the allegations of the complaint raise questions of fact as to whether the written memoranda were sufficient and authenticated so as to comply with the statute of frauds, whether the appellee may be liable for services under an implied contract theory and whether the acts performed by appellant were exclusively referable to the oral agreement so as to constitute part performance or give rise to grounds for restitution on appellant’s behalf.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s complaint and we reverse. This cause is remanded to the court below for reinstatement of the complaint and further proceedings thereon.
Reversed and remanded.
SPECTOR, Acting C. J., and DREW, E. HARRIS (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.