TRAFALGAR DEVELOPERS, LTD., ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
NICK MORLEY ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1974-12-31
No. 74-970
Before HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
305 So. 2d 274 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

Trafalgar Developers appealed the circuit court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action and the court's retention of jurisdiction for purposes of supplemental relief. The Third District affirmed, holding that Florida's declaratory judgment statute does not prohibit retention of jurisdiction and that retaining it serves the statute's purpose of providing adequate and expedient remedies while avoiding multiplicity of suits.


Holding

The circuit court did not err. Florida's declaratory judgment statute (Chapter 86, F.S.) does not prohibit retention of jurisdiction, and retaining jurisdiction in this context complies with the statute's liberal construction requirement and provides defendants with opportunity to seek supplemental relief with proper notice to the plaintiff.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court may retain jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action to consider motions for supplemental relief filed by a party.

[2] The Declaratory Judgment Act is to be construed liberally to avoid multiplicity of suits and provide an adequate and expedient remedy.

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Key Quotes

“Fla.Stats.1967, Chapter 86, F.S.A., providing for declaratory judgments is to be construed and administered liberally in order that a multiplicity of suits can be avoided while affording an adequate and expedient remedy for litigants in one action.”

Establishes the foundational principle that declaratory judgment statutes must be liberally construed to serve their remedial purpose.

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Facts & Procedural History

Trafalgar Developers filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to cancel and rescind certain contracts with Nick Morley and Geneva Investment…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant by way of interlocutory appeal seeks review of the circuit court’s order in accordance with appellate mandate.

Plaintiff, Trafalgar Developers, Ltd., filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to have cancelled and rescinded and made null and void certain contracts with the defendants, Nick Morley and Geneva Investment Limited. Plaintiff prevailed in the circuit court and defendants appealed. This court reversed the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint. Geneva Investment Limited v. Trafalgar Developers, Ltd., Fla.App., 274 So. 2d 581, cert. discharged, Fla.1973, 285 So. 2d 593. Upon remand, the circuit court entered its order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and retaining jurisdiction in the cause for the purpose of considering any motion for supplemental relief filed by defendants pursuant to § 86.061, Fla.Stat. Plaintiff-appellant appeals therefrom and contends that the circuit court erred in retaining jurisdiction in the cause. We cannot agree. First, Fla.Stats.1967, Chapter 86, F.S.A., providing for declaratory judgments is to be construed and administered liberally in order that a multiplicity of suits can be avoided while affording an adequate and expedient remedy for litigants in one action. Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 397. In addition, we find that Chapter 86, after a close reading thereof, does not prohibit the circuit court from reserving jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action.

Second, Lasseter v. Blalock, Fla.App.1962, 139 So. 2d 726, upon which appellant relies, is distinguishable from the case sub judice. Therein, the plaintiffs in their action for declaratory relief merely sought a lien. The circuit court not only granted the requested relief, but in addition ordered foreclosure and enforcement of the lien. The appellate court held that the circuit court exceeded its authority in ordering foreclosure because the defendants as a result thereof were denied reasonable notice and an opportunity to demonstrate to the court why the further relief of the foreclosure and enforcement of the plaintiffs’ lien should not be granted.

The retention of jurisdiction by the circuit court in the case at bar simply provides an opportunity for the defendant-ap-pellees to seek supplemental relief, if they so desire, by filing a petition therefor pursuant to § 86.061, Fla.Stat., thereby giving plaintiff reasonable notice thereof and a right to show cause why further relief should not be granted. See Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club v. Pruitt, 156 Fla. 825, 24 So. 2d 898 (1946); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. State ex rel. Conner, Fla.App.1970, 230 So. 2d 24.

Thus, we conclude that the circuit judge complied with this court’s mandate and at the same time carried out the intent and spirit of the declaratory judgment statute.

Accordingly, the order herein appealed

Affirmed,

hereby is affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …ct, we are unable to accept Lewis as controlling authority here. . 344 So. 2d at 590. This statement was echoed in Mitchell, 346 So. 2d at 568. . See, e. g., Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Trafalgar Developers, Ltd. v. Morley, 305 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 210 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). . § 86.101, Fla.Stat. (1975). . See n. 6 above. . The rule is well established that “in the absence of clear legislative expression…
  • Paris v. Hilton, 352 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
    …under the theory of quantum meruit.2 The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED. SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur. . Geneva Inv. Ltd. v. Trafalgar Developers Ltd, 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973), cert. disch. 285 So. 2d 593 (Fla.1973), appeal after remand 305 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). Paris argues strongly that because he is licensed to practice in Georgia, the citizens of Florida are not exposed to the dangers that the.statute seeks to restrict. Paris argues, just as strongly, that it is inequitable and unco…
  • Trafalgar Developers, Ltd. v. Morley, 317 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1975)
    …Certiorari denied. 305 So. 2d 274. ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.…

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