AURORA HERNANDEZ, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Aurora Hernandez, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, appealed the dismissal of her negligence action against the City of Miami arising from a fatal motorcycle collision. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the City's decision not to station a traffic patrolman at the accident site involved discretionary police powers and did not create a duty owed to the deceased.
The City of Miami did not owe a specific duty to the deceased that would support a negligence claim. The decision to deploy traffic patrolmen is a discretionary exercise of police powers, and any duty breached was only a general public duty that did not inure to the benefit of the deceased.
[1] A municipality's decision regarding the deployment of police resources is a discretionary function for which it cannot be held liable in negligence.
[2] A municipality's duty to provide traffic control is a public duty owed to the general public, not a specific duty owed to individual members of the public.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Inherent in the right of the City of Miami to exercise its police powers is its right to determine the strategy for deployment of those powers, and sovereign authorities ought to be left free to exercise their discretion without worry over possible allegations of negligence.”
Establishes the core principle that cities have discretion in deploying police powers without negligence liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 27-28, 1972, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company worked on underground telephone lines at an intersection in Miami, using a man…
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[*278] PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant appeals an order dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s amended complaint as to the defendant-ap-pellee, the City of Miami, in this negligence action.
On September 27, 1972, the defendant, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company,1 began working upon its underground telephone system, gaining access thereto by the use of a manhole located at the intersection of North Miami Avenue and Northeast 40th Street, Miami, Florida. In order to proceed with the work, the defendant company parked two unattended vehicles in the middle of the street and adjacent to the manhole and, along with other equipment, these vehicles obstructed the view of oncoming motorists both north and southbound. Defendant-appellee, city of Miami, provided a patrolman on the first day of operations [September 27, 1972] to assist in directing traffic at this intersection. However, on the following day [September 28, 1972] there was no patrolman sent to direct traffic. On that day, Vicente Hernandez rode his motorcycle through the subject intersection when he became involved in a collision with another vehicle and, as a result of the injuries sustained thereby, died.
Thereafter, plaintiff [Aurora Hernandez], as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband [Vicente Hernandez], filed a complaint and an amended complaint against the defendants, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company and the City of Miami. The liability of the defendant-appellee, City of Miami, was based upon the theory that the City failed to station a traffic patrolman to assist in directing the traffic at the subject intersection or failed to require that the defendant [Southern Bell] have someone assist in directing the traffic. Thereupon, defendant-appellee, City of Miami, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action against the City. After hearing oral argument thereon, the trial judge dismissed plaintiff-appellant’s complaint with prejudice as to the defendant, City of Miami. Plaintiff appeals therefrom. We affirm.
Inherent in the right of the City of Miami to exercise its police powers is its right to determine the strategy for deployment of those powers, and sovereign authorities ought to be left free to exercise their discretion without worry over possible allegations of negligence. Wong v. City of Miami, Fla.1970, 237 So. 2d 132. The dispatching of a traffic patrolman to the subject intersection in the case sub ju-dice was simply a matter of judgment on the part of the defendant City. See: Raven v. Coates, Fla.App.1961, 125 So. 2d 770.
Thus, it follows that the alleged duty owed by the defendant City to the plaintiff’s deceased husband was no different at the time of the alleged negligence than that owed to every other member of the public and therefore, at most the duty breached was a public duty which did not inure to the benefit of the deceased. See: City of Tampa v. Davis, Fla.App.1969, 226 So. 2d 450.
Accordingly, the order herein appealed hereby is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. Not a party to this appeal.
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Jenkins v. City OF Miami Beach, 389 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…y’s decision to provide no supervision in Stillwater Park at night is a planning or discretionary governmental decision for which the City cannot be held liable in tort.1 Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970); Hernandez v. City of Miami, 305 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Compare Pitts v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).2 However, the very same inquiry requires us to conclude that the City’s alleged negligent maintenance of a water fountain in the park is operational le…
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City OF Belleview v. Belleview Fire Fighters, Inc., 367 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…cannot contract away the exercise of its police powers. The Supreme Court has further stated that the exercise of the police powers includes the right to determine strategy and tactics for the deployment of those powers. Hernandez v. City of Miami, 305 So. 2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). As a matter of law and public policy, the City should be permitted to reclaim the discretions and authorities inherent in the police power of government and the effective supervision and control of both the fire fighting equipment…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wong v. City OF Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970)
- The City OF Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Alvina Ann Raven and John Raven v. Nancie Boughner Coates and David Owen Coates, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)