STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION,
v.
F. W. SIMPSON
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Standard Accident Insurance Company, as surety on a construction bond, sought reimbursement from the principal Simpson for losses paid on a bond. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict and judgment for Simpson, holding that the evidence was insufficient and that Simpson was estopped from impeaching a prior Federal Court judgment that had established liability on the bond.
The court reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict for Simpson and that Simpson was estopped from going behind the prior Federal Court judgment. The court also held that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow appellant's documentary exhibits to be read to the jury.
“The effect of this ruling was to deprive appellant of a fundamental right to fully present its case to the jury.”
Establishes the error of refusing to allow appellant's documentary exhibits to be read to the jury
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSimpson entered into a construction contract and procured Standard Accident Insurance Company as surety, agreeing to reimburse the surety for any loss…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Surety Liability cases and more on FLexlaw
From judgment for appellee based on a jury verdict this appeal is taken.
The controlling question is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment.
The record conclusively reveals that appellee entered into a construction contract and procured appellant to become surety for the faithful completion of the contract. Besides the payment of premium for the bond by appellee, he also agreed to reimburse appellant for any loss on the surety bond. Claims were made against the bond which culminated in a suit in the Federal Court. Among many other parties to the suit in the Federal Court were both appellant and appellee. Final judgment was entered fixing liability against appellant for the full amount of the bond. Appellant paid the judgment and upon appellee’s refusal to reimburse them this action was brought.
The appellant’s case, to a great extent, was made by exhibits. The trial judge refused permission to read same to the jury. So far as the record shows their content was never made known to the jury. The effect of this ruling was to deprive appellant of a fundamental right to fully present its case to the jury. *566Appellee was permitted to give testimony, the effect of which was to impeach the Federal Court judgment. This was’ error. As pointed out- above both appellant and appellee were parties. The case proceeded to final judgment. The prime question there litigated was liability on the bond. Appellee is now estopped to go behind the judgment in this case.
We find the evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict for the appellee and the judgment is reversed for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed..
BROWN, C. J., WHITFIELD and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Dade Cnty. v. Eagle Fam. Disc. Stores, Inc., 380 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…Eagle increase the fire hazard?” Though the causes of action in the two cases are admittedly different, the relevant issues are identical, and a court of competent jurisdiction has decided the exact question. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 151 Fla. 564, 10 So. 2d 85 (1942). Therefore, Dade County is estopped by judgment from litigating the same issue in a state court. City of Hialeah Gardens v. Prieto, 353 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); and we concur with the trial court’s determination that ther…