REGINA CANTOR, APPELLANT,
v.
HERBERT M. CANTOR, APPELLEE
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A wife appealed the denial of her petition to modify a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case. The trial court had denied the modification petition, claiming it lacked jurisdiction because the alimony was labeled "temporary rehabilitative alimony." The appellate court reversed, holding that Florida Statute § 61.14 confers jurisdiction to modify alimony provisions when circumstances change, regardless of terminology used in the original judgment.
The trial court had jurisdiction to modify the alimony provisions. Florida Statute § 61.14 confers jurisdiction on courts to modify alimony awards when circumstances or financial ability of either party changes, and this jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the alimony is labeled "temporary" or "permanent." The presence of language retaining jurisdiction to "enforce" the judgment does not limit the court's broader statutory authority to modify.
[1] A trial court has jurisdiction to modify a final judgment awarding rehabilitative alimony when circumstances or financial ability of either party has changed, pursuant to…
[2] The use of the term "temporary" in conjunction with "rehabilitative alimony" in a final judgment does not divest the court of jurisdiction to modify such alimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The final judgment is unique in that it provides for "temporary rehabilitative alimony." We can see no legal distinction between rehabilitative alimony and "temporary" rehabilitative alimony awarded in a final judgment.”
Establishes that the court rejected the trial court's distinction based on the word "temporary" and found no substantive legal difference in the type of alimony awarded.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce dissolution, the final judgment awarded the wife "temporary rehabilitative alimony" of $300 per month for six months, split into two $150…
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HOBSON, Judge.
Appellant filed a Petition for Modification of Final Judgment entered in a dissolution of marriage suit, which petition was denied by the lower court on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to grant relief sought by the petition.
The order denying appellant’s Petition for Modification of Final Judgment is the subject of this interlocutory appeal.
The sole question involved is whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s petition.
The final judgment provided:
. The husband shall pay to the wife as temporary rehabilitative alimony the sum of $300.00 per month for six (6) months commencing with the 15th day of August, 1973, and continuing for the said period of six (6) months. The said $300.00 monthly payment shall be payable as follows: $150.00 shall be payable on the first of each of the six months and $150.00 shall be payable on the fifteenth day of each of the six months; provided, however, said payments, as stated, shall commence on the 15th day of August, 1973.
The final judgment is unique in that it provides for “temporary rehabilitative alimony.” We can see no legal distinction between rehabilitative alimony and “temporary” rehabilitative alimony awarded in a final judgment.
The trial court was of the opinion that because the word “temporary” preceded the words “rehabilitative alimony” that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Modification. With this we disagree.
Florida Statutes, § 61.14, provides as follows :
Modification of alimony judgments; agreements, etc.—
(1) * * * [Wjhen a party is required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of either party has changed * * *, the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, * * *. [emphasis ours]
The Petition for Modification was filed prior to the expiration of the six months period of rehabilitative alimony provided for in the final judgment. The final judgment also provided that the court retain jurisdiction to enter such further orders necessary to enforce the provisions of this judgment. The appellee contends that the court having retained jurisdiction only to enforce the provisions of the judgment, does not have jurisdiction to modify such judgment as to rehabilitative alimony.
As we view Florida Stat. 61.14, the statute itself confers upon the court jurisdiction to modify the provisions of the final judgment as to rehabilitative or permanent alimony under the appropriate circumstances. Kosch v. Kosch, Fla. 1959, 113 So. 2d 547.
For the foregoing reasons, the order appealed is reversed'and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
McNULTY, C. J., and DAKAN, STEPHEN L., Associate Judge, concur.
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Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…vice of lump sum alimony, payable in installments, by which device also the courts have often settled property rights. . Section 61.08, F.S. 1973. . Cf. Lash v. Lash, n. 1 supra. . Section 61.14, F.S. 1973. Also cf. Cantor v. Cantor (Fla.App.2d), 306 So. 2d 596 (Opinion filed January 24, 1975).…
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Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); Sima v. Sima, 337 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Hernandez v, Hernandez, 325 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Because the issue is a jurisdictional one, it does not matter that the petition was filed on the very last day of the rehabilitative term, see Cann v. Cann, supra, at 334 So. 2d 329, nor — as we hold, contrary to dicta in Lee to…
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Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…udge has not specifically so ruled, we do not now consider the appellant’s contention that such a determination would be error. But see Markgraf v. Markgraf, 320 So. 2d 27 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1976); Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).…
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- Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959)