JOHNNY GISSENDANNER, APPELLANT,
v.
MANCHESTER INSURANCE CO., A FOREIGN INSURANCE CO., DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gissendanner sought to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim against Manchester Insurance Company. The trial court granted summary judgment for Manchester, but the appellate court reversed, holding that filing suit against the uninsured tortfeasor does not bar arbitration rights and the two-year delay in demanding arbitration was reasonable as a matter of law.
Filing suit against the uninsured tortfeasor does not constitute a waiver or bar to arbitration rights, as such suit protects the insurer's subrogation interests and is consistent with the policy. A demand for arbitration made two years after the accident is timely under the five-year statute of limitations analogy, absent special circumstances.
[1] Institution of a lawsuit against a tortfeasor does not estop an insured from compelling arbitration under an uninsured motorist policy when the lawsuit has not been resol…
[2] An insured's demand for arbitration under an uninsured motorist policy is considered timely if made within the period analogous to the statute of limitations, absent exce…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The suit by Gissendanner against Ingram, the uninsured motorist, was not yet resolved nor was there any adjudication on the merits. The posture of such suit comports with the requirements of the policy that the insured protect the subrogation rights and interests of Manchester and, therefore, is not inconsistent with the policy of insurance.”
Establishes that filing suit against the tortfeasor protects rather than waives arbitration rights by preserving the insurer's subrogation interests.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn automobile accident occurred in February 1971. Gissendanner filed suit against Ingram, the alleged uninsured tortfeasor, but the suit remained pend…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Duty To Arbitrate cases and more on FLexlaw
NATHAN, Judge.
This action was commenced by the insured, Gissendanner, appellant, on July 16, 1973, to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist policy in which the appellee, Manchester Insurance Company, was the insurer. The automobile accident on which Gis-sendanner seeks such arbitration occurred in February 1971, and shortly thereafter Gissendanner filed suit against Ingram, the alleged third party tort feasor.
In February 1973, while the suit was pending, Gis-sendanner became aware that Ingram was uninsured and made demand for arbitration upon Manchester which demand was denied. This suit followed. Summary Judgment was entered by the trial court in favor of Manchester which is herein appealed. Gissendanner contends that institution of the suit against Ingram, the tort feasor in this instance does not constitute a bar or estoppel to his suit to compel arbitration. Manchester contends that Gissendanner waived his right to compel arbitration because by filing such suit against Ingram, the third party tort feasor, Gissendanner took a position inconsistent with the policy and further that the demand for arbitration was some two years after the. accident and, therefore, not within a reasonable length of time, which delay constituted prejudice and thus a waiver.
We disagree with Manchester’s contentions.
The suit by Gissendanner against Ingram, the uninsured motorist, was not yet resolved nor was there any adjudication on the merits. The posture of such suit comports with the requirements of the policy that the insured protect the subrogation rights and interests of Manchester and, therefore, is not inconsistent with the policy of insurance. Manchester’s contention that the demand for arbitration which was some two years after the accident and, therefore, prejudicial, is without merit as a reasonable time for such demand is fixed by analogy with the Statute of Limitations 1 which is five years, unless there be some special circumstances shown. Mendlein v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Fla.App.1973, 277 So. 2d 538. In the case sub judice, the record does not disclose any facts or findings thereon showing exceptional circumstances to justify shortening the time for demand or filing of the suit against Manchester to compel arbitration.
The summary judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. See § 95.11(3) Fla.Stat.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hypower, Inc. v. State, 839 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…5 applicable here contains no limitations period governing arbitration, the arbitration request must be made only within a reasonable time. See Stoudenmire v. Florida Loan Co., 117 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960); Gissendanner v. Manchester Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Here, the parties’ contract provided for a 820-day arbitration filing period. However, the qualified acceptance letter from the FDOT to Hypower extended that limitations period to 853 days. See Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 97…
Authorities Cited
- Mendlein v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 277 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)