T.J., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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T.J., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for throwing a rock through a car windshield, resulting in three convictions: throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, culpable negligence, and criminal mischief. The court held that while separate convictions for throwing a deadly missile and criminal mischief are constitutionally permissible, the culpable negligence conviction must be struck because it is essentially identical to the deadly missile offense.
The court held that separate convictions for throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance and criminal mischief are constitutionally permissible because these offenses protect against different evils—one against death or great bodily harm and the other against property damage. However, the culpable negligence conviction must be struck because it is essentially identical to the deadly missile offense and thus unconstitutionally duplicates that conviction.
[1] Separate convictions for throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance and criminal mischief are constitutionally permissible as they address different societal e…
[2] A conviction for culpable negligence is constitutionally impermissible when based on the same act as throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, as these offen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is settled under the Carawan rationale that the offenses of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, § 790.19, Fla.Stat. (1987), which protects against the danger of death or great bodily harm, and criminal mischief, § 806.13, Fla. Stat. (1987), which is désigned to prevent property damage, do not serve to remedy the same evil and that separate convictions of these crimes are thus constitutionally supportable.”
Establishes that the court permits separate convictions for deadly missile and criminal mischief as they protect against different evils
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.J. hurled a rock through an automobile windshield and was adjudicated delinquent based on this single act. He was found guilty of three offenses: th…
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PER CURIAM.
T.J. was adjudicated delinquent because, among other things,1 of his participation in hurling a rock through an automobile windshield. Based on that occurence, he was found guilty of the offenses of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, culpable negligence and criminal mischief. He contends, on the authority of Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1987),2 that this “single act” could constitutionally give rise to no more than a single conviction. We agree only in part.
It is settled under the Carawan rationale that the offenses of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, § 790.19, Fla.Stat. (1987), which protects against the danger of death or great bodily harm, and criminal mischief, § 806.13, Fla. Stat. (1987), which is désigned to prevent property damage, do not serve to remedy the same evil and that separate convictions of these crimes are thus constitutionally supportable. Preston v. State, 397 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); cf. Wilcher v. State, 524 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
The opposite is the case with respect to the culpable negligence charge, § 784.05, Fla.Stat. (1987). It is established that this crime is essentially identical to the deadly missile offense so that simultaneous adjudications may not stand. Anderson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla.1983); Kimbrough v. State, 356 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Accordingly, the adjudication is modified by striking the reference to the offense of culpable negligence and is otherwise affirmed.
. The appellant does not challenge his adjudication for the separate offense of resisting arrest without violence.
. This case arose prior to the July 1, 1988 effective date of the at least partial “repeal" of Cara-wan by Ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Dion Michael Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987)
- Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1983)
- Kimbrough v. State, 356 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Preston v. State, 397 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Earsley Wilcher v. State, 524 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Anderson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)