HUNTER LYON, INC., A CORPORATION,
v.
W. H. WALKER, ET AL.
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Hunter Lyon, Inc., an insurance company, appealed the dismissal of its complaint alleging that directors of a savings and loan association conspired to coerce their loan customers to obtain insurance from competitors rather than from appellant. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the complaint stated a valid cause of action for tortious interference with business relations.
The court held that the declaration states a sufficient cause of action. The tort consists of malicious, wanton, and unlawful disturbance or interference with the plaintiff's business, and proof requires showing that defendants' conduct caused customers to refuse to deal with plaintiff. However, lawful competition, legitimate protection of the mortgagee's loans, or discretionary decisions within reason do not constitute such tortious interference.
“the gist of such actions is the malicious, wanton, and unlawful disturbance or interference with the business of the plaintiff to his damage.”
Establishes the legal standard for tortious interference with business relations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHunter Lyon, Inc. represented certain insurance companies in Dade County engaged in writing fire, windstorm and other insurance. Some of the appellees…
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Appellant represents certain insurance companies in Dade County engaged in the business of writing fire, windstorm and other insurance. Some of the appellees are the directors of First Federal Savings and Loan Association engaged in the business of making first loans on homes and business properties.
Appellant sued appellees for conspiring to coerce those to whom they made loans from securing the properties and the loans with policies in insurance companies represented by them (appellant) thereby wantonly inflicting material damage to appellant and its business. A demurrer to the second amended declaration was sustained, the plaintiff declined to amend and final judgment was entered for the defendant. This appeal was prosecuted.
The sole question is whether or not the declaration states a cause of action for conspiracy to wantonly interfere with appellant’s business. Duval Laundry Co. Inc. v. Reif 130 Fla. 276, 177 So. 726; and Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Fire Ins. Co., 97 Miss. 148, 52 So. 454, are relied on for an affirmative answer to this question.
From these and other cases of like import, the gist of such actions is the malicious, wanton, and unlawful disturbance or interference with the business of the plaintiff to his *63damage. It extends to all classes of contracts and is good against one or all the defendants, the charge of conspiracy being merely the basis to join all as parties defendant.
The evidence must show wanton and unlawful interference resulting in a refusal of customers to deal with the plaintiff. If it shows rather that the conduct of defendant was an incident to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, amounted to nothing more than lawful competition or the exercise of a sound discretion which the law allows a mortgagee to direct within reason, the placing of insurance on the property involved a case of malicious interference is not made.
This rule is particularly applicable to those making high percentage loans on improved property or in cases where it it shown that the insurance agency is for any reason hostile to the lending agency. If the evidence shows these elements rather than malicious interference, relief should be denied. The ultimate issue will be whether the interference charged was done solely through malice or in the lawful protection of defendant’s loans.
We are convinced that the declaration states a cause of action so the judgment below is reversed.
Reversed.
BROWN, C. J„ WHITFIELD, BUFORD, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)…r legal end by unlawful means, to do something wrongful either as a means or an end, or to effect an illegal purpose either by legal or illegal means or to effect a legal purpose by illegal means”. In the case of Hunter Lyon, Inc., v. Walker, 1942, 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. 2d 176, the Supreme Court of Florida held the gist of an action for conspiracy to wantonly interfere with one’s business must be a malicious, wanton, and unlawful disturbance or interference with his business to his damage. Where there is a…
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Robertson v. Indus. Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954)…with reference to the charge of conspiracy to slander, in-view of the principle that the gist of such a charge is the slander itself, which, as we have already held, is non-actionable under the facts of the case at bar. Hunter Lyon, Inc., v. Walker, 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. 2d 176; Loeb v. Geronemus, Fla., 66 So. 2d 241. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed. It is so ordered.' ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and' MATHEWS, JJ., concur.…
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Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977)…. Shea, 300 Mass. 30, 13 N.E. 2d 932 (1938); Cummings v. Harrington, 278 Mass. 527, 180 N.E. 519 (1932).' The essential elements of this tort are a malicious motive and coercion through numbers or economic influence. See Hunter Lyon, Inc. v. Walker, 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. 2d 176 (1942); Regan v. Davis, 97 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957). The District Court of Appeal, Second District, recently followed the reasoning of Snipes in Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Assn., Inc., supra. The plaintiff in Margolin,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Duval Laundry Co., Inc. v. Reif, 130 Fla. 276 (Fla. 1937)