STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
THOMAS A. HENDRICKS, RESPONDENT
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Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the State's petition for certiorari to reverse a dismissal of a traffic violation prosecution based on speedy trial grounds. The court held that the defendant's strategic choice to transfer the case from municipal court to county court to obtain a jury trial constituted a waiver of speedy trial protections and that the trial date set after the transfer was timely.
The court held that defendant's election to transfer the case to county court constituted a waiver of speedy trial rights under the May 15, 1974 deadline, and that speedy trial rights recommenced upon docketing in county court, making the June 5, 1974 jury trial date timely. The court further held that defendant was not 'continuously available' for trial within the meaning of the applicable rule.
[1] A defendant's election to transfer a case from municipal court to county court to obtain a jury trial constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rule protections.
[2] Speedy trial rights recommence upon a case being docketed in a new court after a successful transfer.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The defendant's choice to activate the transfer procedure constituted a waiver of the speedy trial rule and constituted a trial tactic which should not be available to subvert the ends of justice.”
Establishes that defendant's strategic decision to seek jury trial by transferring courts waived his speedy trial protections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant was cited for a traffic violation on January 19, 1974 and the case was set for trial in Hollywood Municipal Court. On February 7, 1974, defe…
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PER CURIAM.
The County Court dismissed a traffic violation prosecution because of the failure to accord the defendant with a speedy trial. The Circuit Court affirmed on appeal. The State petitions for Writ of Cer-tiorari.
The calendar of pertinent events:
January 19, 1974 Defendant was cited for a traffic violation and the case was set to be tried in the Hollywood Municipal Court.
February 7, 1974 Defendant filed a motion demanding a speedy trial by a jury of his peers.
February 28, 1974 Defendant petitioned the City to transfer the case to the County Court pursuant to F.S. 932.61 so that he might receive a jury trial.
March 7, 1974 The case was ordered transferred.
March 12, 1974 The case was docketed in the County Court.
May 29, 1974 Defendant filed a Motion to Discharge on the basis that he had not received a speedy trial because he had not been tried within either 60 or 90 days from time of his municipal arrest.
June 5, 1974 The cause was ordered dismissed on the same date that jury trial had been ordered.
October 21, 1974 The Circuit Court affirmed the order of dismissal on the basis of a literal interpretation of traffic court Rule 6.13, which provides:
“The trial of all persons taken into custody prior to the effective date of this Rule (12.01 A.M. February 15, 1974) shall commence on or before May 15, 1974 . . .
and Rule 3.191 F.R.Cr.P. It appears to have been the holding of the court that, since defendant was not tried before May 15, 1974, regardless of circumstances and any other considerations, the court was mandated to simply dismiss the case.
It appears that, without contention to the contrary, a municipal trial was available to the defendant prior to May 15, 1974.
Clearly defendant had no constitutional right to a jury trial. His was only a statutory right to transfer to another court, if, as was the case here, the City did not offer a jury trial. The defendant’s choice to activate the transfer procedure constituted a waiver of the speedy trial rule and constituted a trial tactic which should not be available to subvert the ends of justice. Instead, the speedy trial rights should have simply recommenced upon his case having been docketed in the County Court; the June 5, 1974 jury trial date was, therefore, timely.
Moreover, by moving to transfer the cause from the Municipal Court to the County Court the defendant was not ‘ continuously available” for trial within the meaning of Rule 3.191(a)(2), FRCrP; see Rubiera v. Dade County ex rel. Benitez, Fla.1974, 305 So. 2d 161.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted and the decision of the circuit court is quashed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to vacate the order pf the county court and reinstate the prosecution.
WALDEN, MAGER and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
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Humphrey v. Seminole Cnty. Court, 309 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of State v. Hendricks, 309 So. 2d 232 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1975), and McArthur v. State, 303 So. 2d 359 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1974). Affirmed. WALDEN, CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1976)…ion cases prior to the decriminalization of traffic laws which have influenced our decision. Firstly, it has been well established that there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury for a violation of a municipal ordinance. State v. Hendricks, 309 So. 2d 232 (Fla.App.4th 1975); Fort Lauderdale v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494 (Fla.App.4th 1970). This is true of cases involving violations of municipal traffic ordinances, including those governing driving while intoxicated. Boyd v. Dade County, 123 So. 2d 323 (Fla…
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State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ply to proceedings in municipal courts. State ex rel Savage v. Kaplan, 297 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Accordingly, Thaddies had no rights under the rule on the charges filed against him in municipal court. It is true that in State v. Hendricks, 309 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), we held that a defendant waived his speedy trial rights under Rule 3.191 when he requested a transfer of pending traffic charges from municipal court to state court. But in Hendricks, Rule 6.13 of the Rules for Traffic Court spe…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Honorable C. P. Rubiera v. Dade Cnty., 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1974)