DANIEL R. ROSE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the conviction was not solely based on circumstantial evidence and the failure to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence was not reversible error.
Appellant was convicted of attempted robbery. The victim witnessed another man take money and appellant demand a portion of the proceeds, pursuing the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sufficiency Of Circumstantial Evidence cases and more on FLexlaw
WALDEN, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of attempted robbery. He appeals on two grounds:
1. That his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and that such evidence is not sufficient because it is not inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and
2. That the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence as requested by the defense.
Appellant’s contentions are without merit. We affirm.
Appellant’s conviction was not based solely on circumstantial evidence. There was this direct evidence: the victim of the robbery, a witness and cook at a Royal Castle, witnessed the removal of money from her cash register by a man, not appellant, and then witnessed a demand by the appellant for a portion of the proceeds. When the other man left the restaurant, appellant pursued him, saying, “Hey, wait for me. I want some of that.” The two men, while having an altercation in the street were apprehended by police.
This evidence, together with the other circumstances brought out in the State’s case, was sufficient as being inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See, McBride v. State, 191 So. 2d 70 (Fla.App. 1st 1966).
While it would have been proper for the trial court to have given an instruction on circumstantial evidence, we are persuaded that the failure to do so was not harmful or prejudicial to a degree as would require a reversal. A consideration of all the charges and a review of the direct evidence lead us to this conclusion. State v. Anderson, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1973).
Affirmed.
OWEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dunn v. State, 454 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…only where the State’s case was solely circumstantial, see, e.g., Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971), rev. on other grounds, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1972). Later other cases applied the harmless error statute, see, e.g., Rose v. State, 310 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). A circumstantial evidence jury charge was included in the original jury instructions in criminal cases approved in 1970 by the Florida Supreme Court (240 So. 2d 472) but was soon criticized (see, e.g., Willcox v. State, 258 So.…
Authorities Cited
- Bruno v. State, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. Anderson, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972)
- McBRIDE v. State, 191 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)