RONALD LEE THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Lee Thompson was convicted of breaking and entering two separate medical offices with intent to commit petit larceny. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, holding that the physical separation of the offices (each with distinct entrances, addresses, and limited access between them) supported guilty verdicts for breaking into both offices despite Thompson's argument that he only intended to break into the building generally, not each office specifically.
The convictions for breaking and entering both offices were affirmed. The court held that the physical separation of the offices—each with separate entrances, separate street addresses, separately maintained by occupants, and limited access between them—justified convictions for breaking into both offices, and that intent to break and enter can be inferred from circumstances even without direct proof.
[1] A conviction for breaking and entering a specific office may be sustained even if the initial intent was to break into a larger building containing multiple offices, prov…
[2] Intent to break and enter may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act, rather than requiring direct proof of the defendant's subjective intent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record in this case indicates that the offices burglarized were clearly identifiable as being of particular types. Each office was separately maintained by the respective occupants. Moreover, each office had a separate entrance and a separate street address.”
Establishes the legal basis for treating the two offices as distinct structures despite their physical connection, supporting separate convictions for each break-in.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThompson, Douglas King, and James Poole planned to break into a medical building to obtain drugs. The building contained two separate offices: Dr. Usd…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*449] BOYER, Judge,
By information, appellant, one of the defendants below, and a co-defendant, Douglas King, were charged in Count I with breaking and entering the office of Dr. Daniel R. Usdin with the intent to commit grand larceny and in Count II with breaking and entering the office of Dr. Robert Rampton with the intent to commit grand larceny. Under each count the defendant was found guilty by a jury of the lessor included offenses of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a petit larceny. The sole issue on this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to sustain the guilty verdict as to Count I.
The following facts were proved at trial: The appellant, together with Douglas King and James Poole decided to break into a medical building for the purpose of obtaining drugs. The building, owned by Dr. Usdin, contained two offices. The office of Dr. Usdin who is a medical doctor, is separated from the office of Dr. Ramp-ton, an orthodontist, by an air conditioning room, the door of which is usually kept closed and boarded up with plywood. A cabinet covers the upper half of the door area but not the bottom half. With King keeping watch, the appellant and Poole went into Dr. Rampton’s office after breaking a window. Finding nothing there that they wanted to take, they entered Dr. Usdin’s office by kicking in the door to the air conditioning room. Inside this office, they took a quantity of drugs and syringes, as well as the physician’s desk reference book.
From these facts, appellant concludes that although it was the intention of all three participants to break into the building in which both doctors’ offices were located, neither he nor his two companions had any conscious intent to break and enter the adjoining office of Dr. Usdin which was separated by the air conditioning room. Since no evidence was introduced at trial to establish that the appellant had formed a specific intent to break and enter Dr. Usdin’s office, appellant argues that his conviction for breaking and entering Dr. Usdin’s office must be reversed.
We must reject appellant’s logic. The record in this case indicates that the offices burglarized were clearly identifiable as being of particular types. Each office was separately maintained by the respective occupants. Moreover, each office had a separate entrance and a separate street address. Even though the offices were technically connected by an air conditioning room which had doors leading into the two office areas, access between the two offices via the air conditioning room was not feasible. Specifically, a cabinet blocked the upper half of the door area and the door between Dr. Rampton’s office, and the air conditioning room was boarded up with plywood. Under these circumstances, convictions for breaking and entering both offices are justified. (See Cole v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 276 So. 2d 100) Bearing in mind that intent to break and enter is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from the circumstances by the trier of the fact, there is ample evidence in the record to sustain the breaking and entering conviction as to both counts of the information. (Jones v. State, Fla.App.3d 1966, 192 So. 2d 285)
Affirmed.
RAWLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…roviding intent, the State may rely on circumstantial evidence. (Simpson v. State, 1921, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920; Edwards v. State, Fla.App.3rd 1968, 213 So. 2d 274) Intent may be inferred from the circumstances. (Thompson v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 310 So. 2d 448, opinion filed April 9, 1975) Nor is the State required to show that the intent to escape existed prior to, or even contemporaneously with, the physical act of escape. Even though a defendant may not possess the necessary mental element at the time…
Authorities Cited
- Esaw Jones v. State, 192 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Emil T. Cole v. State, 276 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)